Examining consumers\u27 cognitive and behavioral responses to belief disconfirmation by Darrat, Aadel A.
Louisiana Tech University
Louisiana Tech Digital Commons
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
Fall 2016
Examining consumers' cognitive and behavioral
responses to belief disconfirmation
Aadel A. Darrat
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.latech.edu/dissertations
Part of the Marketing Commons
EXAMINING CONSUMERS’ COGNITIVE AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO BELIEF 
DISCONFIRMATION
by
Aadel A. Darrat, B.S., M.B.A.
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment 
o f the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor o f  Business Administration





INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
ProQuest 10307780
ProQuest
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
LO U ISIA N A  TECH U N IV ERSITY
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
S eptem ber8 , 2016
Date
We hereby recommend that the dissertation prepared under our supervision
Aadel Darrat
entitled_______________________________________________________________________
Examining Consum ers' Cognitive and Behavioral R esponses to Belief 
Disconfirmation
be accepted in partial fulfillment o f  the requirements for the Degree o f
Doctor of Business Administration
Marketing and Analysis
Supervisor o f Dissertation Research




Dr. Barry B iom  .
y^ josv^ '\v \ooL cu J^




yQ  -To r __
rorm Francis Dean of the Grddu&te School, Dr. Sheryl Shoemaker
iroved:
Director o f Graqaatc Studies,
Dean of the College Dr. Christopher Martin
OS Form 13a 
(6/07)
ABSTRACT
This study explores possible reasons for why consumers persist in their beliefs 
despite being exposed to substantial disconfirming evidence. The theory o f cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger 1957) provides an important foundation for the pervasiveness o f 
the confirmation bias and belief perseverance. Four main research paradigms o f 
cognitive dissonance theory are discussed: free choice, induced or forced compliance, 
belief disconfirmation, and hypocrisy. Confirmation bias and belief perseverance are 
positioned in the belief disconfirmation paradigm.
Confirmation bias refers to the general tendency to readily accept evidence that 
supports one’s beliefs and to reject or avoid evidence that goes against such beliefs. 
Belief perseverance, a phenomenon attributed to the confirmation bias, is the tendency 
to continue believing what we do in the face o f  disconfirming evidence. This study 
assesses whether contrary evidence has an effect on consumer beliefs regarding the 
perceived benefits o f  organic food consumption.
Dissonance research in marketing has primarily focused on consumer decision 
making and post-purchase regret. For this reason, the study examines the impact o f pre­
purchase cognitive dissonance using a mixed methods approach. Subjects are exposed to 
considerable disconfirming evidence, and subsequent belief perseverance (or change) is
examined. These effects on cognitive dissonance and purchase behavior are tested. A 
qualitative assessment o f open-ended responses regarding instances o f belief 
perseverance is also conducted; results and key managerial implications are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Belief Perseverance
" I f  one were to attempt to identify a single problematic aspect o f  human reasoning that 
deserves attention above all others, the confirmation bias would have to be among the 
candidates fo r  consideration " (Nickerson 1998, 175).
Accumulated evidence demonstrates that purchasing behaviors are influenced by 
consumers’ personal values, cognitions, and experiences (Cummings and Venkatesen 
1976; Pious 1993; Benoit and Benoit 2008). Dramatic advancements in information 
accessibility have made consumers more aware o f third party evaluations o f  brands. For 
instance, consumers can readily access expert opinions, user experiences and/or product 
reviews online. That said, what occurs when consumer beliefs about a brand are 
disconfirmed by new evidence? Do information credibility and brand involvement 
matter? Do consumers persist in their attitudes about the brand, or do they change their 
behaviors based on the new information? Can consumer beliefs and opinions about 
brands impede their rationality? This research intends to address these questions.
Belief perseverance represents a general psychological phenomenon that involves 
the tendency o f  consumers to cling to their belief systems even after receiving new 
information that contradicts or disconfirms those beliefs (Anderson 2007). In other 
words, belief perseverance describes the tendency to continue believing and behaving in 
ways that contradict disconfirming evidence.
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Belief perseverance is typically tested using an experimental setting known as 
the debriefing paradigm (Ross, Lepper and Hubbard 1975; Anderson, Lepper and Ross 
1980; Anderson 1982; Misra 1992). In this brand o f  experimentation, false evidence 
(unknowingly to subjects) is presented regarding a particular hypothesis, after which 
subjects’ attitude change is measured. Subjects are then ‘debriefed’ by their 
experimenters when the fictitious evidence is brought to light and completely discredits 
the basis for any possible changes in belief. The last stage o f the experimentation 
measures attitude change once more to determine if  incorrect beliefs formed by the 
subjects persist even after standard debriefing.
Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) conducted experimental research that 
revealed the strength o f belief perseverance. They asked subjects to distinguish between 
real and fake suicide notes and provided them with random feedback afterward; some o f 
the subjects were informed that they succeeded, while others were informed that they 
failed at the given task. Even after being fully debriefed, subjects were still influenced 
by the feedback they had previously received. That is, subjects still believed that they 
were better or worse at the given task depending on their initial feedback.
In another debriefing study, Anderson, Lepper, and Ross (1980) exposed 
subjects to two case studies that portrayed either a positive or a negative relationship 
between risk taking and success as a firefighter. The notion o f belief perseverance was 
supported regardless o f the particular relationship “evidence” that the subjects were 
exposed to, i.e. whether risky firefighters are better at their jobs or vice-versa. 
Experimental results also suggest that belief perseverance is enhanced when subjects are 
explicitly asked to explain the evidence they were given. In addition, the researchers
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conclude that “initial beliefs may persevere in the face o f a subsequent invalidation o f 
the evidence on which they are based, even when this initial evidence is itself as weak 
and inconclusive as a single pair o f  dubiously representative cases” (Anderson, Lepper 
and Ross 1980, 1045).
Subsequent research by Anderson (1982) reveals that subjects that were 
encouraged to consider both positive and negative relationships between risk preference 
and firefighter success showed significantly less belief perseverance. In one o f the very 
few marketing papers that tests belief perseverance, Misra (1992) examines subject 
responses to rumors about restaurant and retailing chains and provides results to further 
support the underlying phenomenon o f  confirmation bias and belief perseverance.
According to Godden (2012), belief perseverance presents two issues regarding 
reasoning and rationality. The first issue is the inherent difficulty o f “describing the 
nature and extent o f the phenomenon, and o f explaining how and why it occurs” (Godden 
2012, 51). The second issue with research on belief perseverance is the normative 
concern o f  “whether, and to what extent, belief perseverance is rational” (Godden 2012, 
51). The focus o f this dissertation is on the first issue in addition to investigating the 
impact o f belief perseverance on salient marketing outcomes.
Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias is a one-sided case-building process that involves the unwitting 
selectivity in the acquisition and use o f evidence (Nickerson 1998). In other words, 
confirmation bias represents people’s general tendency to 1) readily accept evidence that 
supports their beliefs, and 2) reject evidence that goes against their beliefs. People might 
try to discredit evidence that disagrees with their beliefs, and/or they might choose to
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avoid exposure to the disconfirming evidence all together. Confirmation bias has become 
somewhat o f a “catch-all phrase” that incorporates biases in both information search and 
interpretation (Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom 1983). However, according to Pious (1993), 
the term typically refers to a preference for information that is consistent with a 
hypothesis instead o f information which opposes it. This reality is contrary to the 
standard rules o f philosophy o f science that lay a heavy emphasis on testing hypotheses 
by trying to refute or falsify them. Scientific researchers are also people and are therefore 
prone to exhibiting confirmation bias; they should be extra cautious with their data search 
and their interpretation.
Sir Francis Bacon is one o f the earlier prominent thinkers who identified this 
particular type o f cognitive bias centuries ago in his Novum Organum Scientiarum, or 
‘New Instrument o f Science’ published in 1620:
“The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion ... draws all 
things else to support and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and 
weight o f  instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and 
despises, or else by some distinction sets aside and rejects” (cited in Lord, Ross 
and Lepper 1979, 2098).
Positive test strategy is an intentional search for confirming evidence (Kahneman 
2011). That people/researchers tend to seek data that are more likely to be compatible 
with their beliefs is well-known. For example, according to DeMers (2015), confirmation 
bias is one o f  the most common cognitive biases for business owners. Entrepreneurs, 
especially those who are passionate about their business, have a high tendency to 
interpret information based on previous beliefs or assumptions, rather than letting the
5
data speak for themselves. Confirmation bias commonly leads entrepreneurs to interpret 
qualitative data, such as survey comments, in a way that endorses their preconceived 
notions, i.e. readily accepting supportive data and dismissing, or arguing against, the 
validity o f any disconfirming data. Hence, DeMers (2015) recommends that 
entrepreneurs should let the numbers do the talking and overcome confirmation bias by 
relying more on quantitative rather than qualitative data.
Mynatt, Doherty, Tweney (1977; 1978) suggest that confirmation bias is difficult 
to eliminate. In their 1977 study, they designed a simulated research environment in 
which they asked subjects to seek out particular laws o f particle motion. The subjects 
were randomly provided with one o f three separate directives that consisted o f 
instructions to confirm, instructions to disconfirm, or instructions to test. Depending on 
which instructions were received, the subjects were informed that the fundamental duty 
o f a scientist is 1) confirming/supporting theories and hypotheses, 2) disconfirming/ 
disproving theories and hypotheses, or 3) testing theories and hypotheses. Results 
showed that subjects were much more likely to search for confirming evidence 
regardless o f which instructions were received. Even the subjects who received 
instructions to disconfirm tended to exhibit substantial confirmation bias during the 
discovery task (Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney 1977).
In their subsequent research, Mynatt et al. (1978) examined instructions to 
disconfirm even further using a similar study design. However, this time the subjects 
were randomly assigned to one o f  only two groups. The subjects either did not receive 
any instructions at all (control group), or the subjects received very thorough 
instructions to disconfirm that stressed the importance o f falsification and testing
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multiple hypotheses. Yet, again, the extensive instructions to disconfirm had very little 
or no effect on trying to diminish the inherent confirmation biases o f  the subjects 
(Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney 1978).
How does confirmation bias affect consumers? Due to this particular type o f 
cognitive bias, consumers find it easier to accept information that confirms what they 
already believe regarding products, services, prices, preferred brands, etc., instead o f 
having to reformulate their views. Conversely, consumers may tend to ignore information 
that contradicts their beliefs. As inquisitive human beings constantly striving to make 
connections, consumers are very good at finding patterns where they are not, and this 
may lead to a warped understanding o f reality. Unfortunately, many consumers would 
likely ignore any information which may prove them wrong. Hence, overcoming 
confirmation bias can be a problem for marketers who aim at providing objective 
information that contradicts consumer beliefs.
Motivation for the Study
Consumers make purchases in the pursuit o f value. This pursuit is driven by 
consumers’ recognition o f a value deficit or imbalance. Thus, the goal o f marketing is to 
create value for consumers. Bazerman (2001) argues for a more consumer-focused 
approach o f consumer research to help people make wiser decisions. With an ethical, 
consumer-centric mindset, the goal o f  marketing should be to create true and unbiased 
value for consumers. What if consumers hold incorrect beliefs regarding products, 
services, prices, brands, etc.? The effects o f  this quandary may be in favor or not in favor
7
o f marketers. At any rate, marketers should feel a sense o f  responsibility in ensuring that 
their customers are well-informed and aware o f the facts pertaining to their value 
offerings.
In particular, according to the U.S. Department o f Agriculture (USDA), the goal 
o f organic foods and organic farming is to “integrate cultural, biological, and mechanical 
practices that foster cycling o f resources, promote ecological balance, and conserve 
biodiversity.” Products are only labeled “USDA organic” when they contain 95% or 
more certified organic contents.
People who buy organic food pay premium prices and cite the following reasons 
for doing so (Watson 2012):
1) Organic foods are “safer,” e.g. organic fruits and vegetables are generally 
grown without chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and organically raised 
livestock are not given any growth hormones or antibiotics.
2) Organic farming practices are “kinder to the environment,” i.e. they are 
designed to be more sustainable by emphasizing conservation and 
reducing pollutants.
3) Organic foods are “healthier,” i.e. organic foods are more nutritious than 
conventionally farmed foods.
Watson (2012) asserts that o f these three reasons, the healthy/nutritional claims 
for organic foods have been the most unsubstantiated. For example, Smith-Spangler et al. 
(2012) evaluated extensive data by conducting a meta-analysis that included 237 studies 
o f  foods and o f  human diets. The noteworthy research endeavor was not outside financed 
for the prevention o f conducting biased research (Chang 2012). The researchers, from
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Stanford University, concluded that organic fruits and vegetables are not more nutritious 
than conventionally farmed produce. Furthermore, results showed that there are no 
significant health advantages to organic meats, and that organic foods are not any less 
likely to be contaminated by dangerous bacteria such as E. coli. Organic produce, 
however, did have 30% lower risk o f contamination with detectable pesticide residue 
compared to conventional produce (Smith-Spangler et al. 2012). Nonetheless, Dena 
Bravata, one o f the Stanford University researchers, asserted that there is no robust 
evidence to choose organic over conventional foods if  the choice is based mainly on the 
idea that organic foods would provide more nutrients (Chang 2012).
How will organic food buyers, especially those who strongly believe that organic 
food is more nutritious than conventional food, react to this disconfirming information? 
Will their beliefs change or will they persevere? Would buyers o f organic food continue 
to buy (and pay more for) organic if  they become aware o f  this disconfirming 
information? These are some o f the issues that have inspired this research endeavor.
Research Questions
Can varying message components such as the source o f information/credibility 
and message strength affect people’s knowledge change? One potential response to this 
question is perhaps not. Through the study o f belief change in the debriefing paradigm, 
mentioned previously, beliefs have been documented to change and persevere in the face 
o f even weak initial “evidence” (e.g. Anderson, Lepper and Ross 1980). Is the same true 
for belief change outside the realm o f the debriefing paradigm? Can varying strength o f 
actual evidence affect consumer beliefs?
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Peeters (1983) provides an especially interesting direction for future research on 
belief perseverance in the realm o f consumer behavior that she labels “hypothesis- 
testing.” In her investigative framework, subjects are presented with a modem hypothesis 
to test. Evidence provided would need to include an explanation for the subjects' previous 
beliefs along with even more influential opposing or disconfirming evidence regarding 
what “should” be believed. She suggests that such a technique could be effective in 
bringing about belief change. If subjects accept the new hypothesis for testing, then they 
will tend to begin collecting confirming evidence for the new hypothesis. Thus, through 
this hypothesis-testing experience, subjects may attain a sense o f  awareness o f their 
current beliefs in tandem with why they should change their beliefs in light o f the new 
evidence. With the guidance o f the experimenter, the subjects will essentially be doing a 
form o f process debriefing on their own (Peeters 1983).
The study will use 1) a partial hypothesis-testing framework to examine the 
effects o f  belief disconfirmations and 2) a qualitative assessment o f belief change 
resistance. The study will investigate the research questions regarding dissonance and 
belief perseverance which can have significant implications for marketing and consumer 
behavior:
RQ1: C 1an disconfirming evidence exposure induce considerable dissonance? I f  
so, how does varying the strength o f  disconfirming factual evidence affect 
consumer beliefs?
RQ2: What are the effects o f  dissonance (consonance) resulting from belief 
disconfirmation (confirmation) on purchase-related outcomes?
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RQ3: Why do consumers continue to hold onto their beliefs even though they are 
exposed to robust, disconfirming evidence that suggests a be lie f change is 
warranted?
In summary, the ensuing research will assess whether robust, disconfirming 
evidence has an effect on consumer beliefs. The investigation will attempt to induce a 
state o f dissonance via belief disconfirmation and will also evaluate salient marketing 
outcomes including perceived value, purchase intention, and word-of-mouth. 
Furthermore, the research will attempt to discover reasons why consumers might persist 
in their inaccurate beliefs despite being exposed to substantial disconfirming evidence.
Contributions of the Research
Theoretical Contributions 
This research aims at linking the pervasive psychological phenomena o f 
confirmation bias and belief perseverance to Festinger’s (1957) theory o f  cognitive 
dissonance. Consumer research on cognitive dissonance has limited the scope o f this 
extensive theory by narrowly focusing on occurrences o f dissonance after a consumer has 
made a decision or a purchase. Although available research on post-purchase dissonance 
(or buyer’s remorse) provides important theoretical and practical implications, the current 
study argues that dissonance may arise in numerous ways other than decision making.
Among the main goals o f  this study is to demonstrate that dissonance could arise 
prior to a purchase due to belief disconfirming evidence regarding perceived product 
benefits. This research attempts to invoke dissonance by presenting people with 
disconfirming evidence about the perceived benefits o f buying and consuming organic 
foods. An empirical test o f  dissonance provocation resulting from perceived belief
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disconfirmations is conducted. Moreover, the research examines the impending effects o f 
dissonance on purchase-related intentions. Consequently, this research will offer and use 
an alternative approach to testing cognitive dissonance theory.
An examination o f extant literature reveals a lack o f existing scales for measuring 
a person’s proclivity to belief perseverance. A qualitative investigation o f why consumer 
beliefs persevere could initiate a solid foundation for developing a new scale o f  belief 
perseverance. Developing such a scale would be a valuable tool for consumer research 
aiming to identify and examine obstinate consumer behavior.
Managerial Contribution 
According to Hunt (1970), academic research on cognitive dissonance could only 
benefit marketing practitioners if  it provides guidance as to what can and should be done 
about a custom er’s dissonance. Marketing managers are cognizant that being able to 
successfully reduce dissonance levels o f their patrons can provide a very vital 
competitive advantage. Answering the question o f why custom ers’ erroneous beliefs can 
persist despite exposure to substantial disconfirming evidence should offer important 
implications for marketing strategy.
For instance, it can be argued that consumers tend to adopt inaccurate information 
when such information promotes a potentially ingratiating self-concept. Given that 
organic food consumption is generally considered prosocial, and therefore potentially 
ingratiating, consumers may aspire to be perceived as someone who consumes organic 
food. As such, consumers with a positive orientation toward organic food promotion, in 
particular, may make themselves vulnerable to accepting superficial information or even 
information that is known to be incorrect if  that information promotes their self-image. It
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is conceivable that this effect would be exacerbated in instances o f high category 
involvement. Therefore, this research has important implications for policy makers and 
marketers in their quest to educate consumers and influence their behaviors. Moreover, a 
qualitative assessment o f belief perseverance is a step forward for more constructive 
communication between policy makers, marketers, and customers about how to mitigate 
the enactment o f incorrect beliefs.
How can managers convince consumers to disconfirm preconceived notions about 
certain products? How can they use their promotions to strengthen the argument against 
misguided consumption and get consumers to question their behaviors?
To the researcher’s knowledge, consider-the-opposite strategy is the only 
available technique that has been shown to successfully remedy the confirmation bias and 
instances o f  belief perseverance (Ross, Lepper and Hubbard 1975; Anderson 1982; Lord, 
Lepper and Preston 1984). This technique simply involves encouraging customers to 
reflect on reasons that their subjective beliefs might be incorrect and why the opposing 
view may instead be true. The current study will utilize open-ended statements that aim 
to reveal why beliefs persist in the face o f disconfirming evidence. This investigation 
could potentially discover new corrective strategies for overcoming belief perseverance. 
Moreover, the current study will provide marketers with alternative de-biasing strategy(s) 
for “considering the opposite.”
Dissertation Organization
Whereas Chapter One opens the subject o f confirmation bias and the phenomenon 
o f belief perseverance, Chapter Two links these phenomena to the relevant theoretical 
framework(s). Moreover, an overview o f research on cognitive dissonance and belief
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disconfirmation is provided along with a research model and subsequent hypotheses. 
Chapter Three outlines the research methodology as well as measurement instruments 
used for testing the research hypotheses. In Chapter Four, the study results are reported 
and analyzed. Lastly, Chapter Five offers a discussion o f findings, contributions o f the 
dissertation, study limitations and avenues for future research.
CHAPTER TWO
DEFINITIONS, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Theories o f Cognitive Consistency
Where does belief perseverance fit in the grand scheme o f theory? Cognitive 
consistency theories are a cluster o f  principles o f social psychology that attempt to 
uncover and explain human cognition (Simon and Holyoak 2002). Theories o f cognitive 
consistency suggest that people are inherently inclined to maintain equilibrium between 
their beliefs and observable behaviors and seek to resolve any inconsistencies (Abelson et 
al. 1968). Cognitive consistency theories include balance theory (Heider 1958), congruity 
theory (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955), symmetry theory (Newcomb 1953), affective- 
cognitive consistency (Rosenberg 1956), and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 
1957). There are various ways o f referring to cognitive inconsistencies depending on the 
theory evoked (e.g. cognitive imbalance, incongruence, asymmetry, inconsistency, 
dissonance). A major assumption in such theories is that people are motivated to seek 
harmonious attitudes, thoughts, beliefs, values, behaviors, and feelings.
Theories o f  cognitive consistency share the same Gestaltian origins. Gestalt 
psychology or gestalism is a school o f thought that stresses the importance o f individual 
perceptions and maintains that the mind exists independently with a reality o f  its own.
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According to Gestalt psychology, people have a natural tendency to perceive the 
environment in ways that are simple and coherent (Kohler 1929).
Balance theory (Heider 1958) explains how a person develops his/her 
relationships with other people and his/her environment (triadic format). Assuming that 
people see a set o f cognitive elements as being a system, the theory suggests that people 
will have a preference to maintain a balanced state among these elements. Consequently, 
when a person perceives an imbalance, he/she will be motivated to restore that balance.
Due to its rigid triadic structure, balance theory is not capable o f describing the 
beliefs leading to one’s attitude toward an object. More specifically, the theory is 
incapable o f  explaining the variability o f belief strength or message content. According to 
Benoit and Benoit (2008), the theory’s underlying components are more informative and 
less explanatory. Thus, balance theory appears to have many limitations in prediction and 
explanation.
Congruity theory (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955) predicts that when a change 
occurs, it is always toward greater congruity with dominant frames o f reference. The 
theory is deemed a special case o f balance theory since it specifically focuses on attitudes 
a person holds toward sources o f  information and the objects o f  the source’s assertions. 
Congruity theory is perhaps the most limited consistency theory since it only relates to 
attitude change (Shaw and Costanzo 1970). Hence, like balance theory, this particular 
theory o f cognitive consistency does not provide a detailed account o f the belief system, 
which is a fundamental notion in this research endeavor.
Symmetry theory (Newcomb 1953) suggests that people attempt to influence each 
another to achieve a state o f equilibrium. The term ‘symmetry’ is used to distinguish the
16
theory from balance theory. Symmetry theory may be classified as a theory o f 
interpersonal attraction that deals with communication among people. Thus, symmetry 
theory is an inappropriate alternative for explaining consumers’ cognitive and behavioral 
responses to disconfirming evidence.
Affective-cognitive consistency theory (Rosenberg 1956) explores the 
relationship between beliefs and attitudes and maintains that people need to have 
coherence or stability between their cognitions and their attitudes toward certain objects 
or situations. The theory predicts that persuasive efforts that change the cognitive 
component o f  attitude will lead to a change in overall attitudes toward an object. 
According to affective-cognitive consistency theory, people who have a high consistency 
between the affective and cognitive components o f their attitudes will exhibit a more 
articulate and more stable disposition. On the other hand, people who have a low 
consistency between the two attitudinal components will have less articulate and less 
stable dispositions (Rosenberg 1968).
Affective-cognitive consistency theory is typically noted in studies o f attitude 
polarization (e.g. Chaiken and Yates 1985). As will be argued shortly, attitude 
polarization, as well as belief perseverance and illusory correlation, has links to 
confirmation bias and is rooted in the theory o f cognitive dissonance. Hence, dissonance 




O f the various cognitive consistency theories, cognitive dissonance appears a 
dominant theory since it is broad and deals with behavior in general, both social and 
nonsocial (See Figure 2.1). First explored in detail by the social psychologist Leon 
Festinger (1957), the theory o f cognitive dissonance is a theory o f  human motivation 
asserting that it is psychologically uncomfortable to hold contradictory cognitions. The 
theory suggests that people have an inner drive to hold all o f their attitudes and their 
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Figure 2.1 Theory Hierarchy o f  B elief Perseverance
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Therefore, dissonance, being unpleasant, motivates a person to change his 
cognition, attitude, or behavior. Festinger proposed that cognitive inconsistency is the 
underlying psychological motivation that is responsible for the various persuasion effects 
o f cognitive dissonance. Put differently, cognitive inconsistency evokes motivation to 
reduce inconsistency. Consequently, cognitive dissonance theory was heavily criticized 
for being a theory o f inconsistency (Singer 1966). Nevertheless, cognitive dissonance 
theory has been and continues to be the most extensive o f the cognitive consistency 
theories and highly regarded in consumer behavior and theories o f social psychology 
(Shaw and Costanzo 1970).
Hunt (1970) provides a useful summary o f dissonance theory along with the 
definition and descriptions o f cognitions (cited in p. 46):
1. Cognitions are the bits o f knowledge one has about himself, about his behavior,
and about his surroundings.
2. Two cognitions are in a dissonant state if, considering these two alone, the
obverse o f  one cognition would follow from the other.
3. Two cognitions are consonant if  one cognition does follow from the other.
4. Two cognitions are irrelevant if  one cognition implies nothing at all concerning
the other.
Cognitive responses are defined as “any thoughts that arise during the process o f 
elaboration when people relate message material to other message content or to their 
preexisting knowledge and views stored in memory” (Meyers-Levy and Malaviya 1999, 
47). Based on the definition and descriptions o f cognitions, Festinger (1957) describes 
dissonance as a conflict situation between the knowledge o f  reality that individuals
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perceive about themselves, their behaviors, and their surroundings. Conversely, 
consonance is described as a no-conflict, harmonious state. Thus, cognitive dissonance 
theory is categorized into three parts (Festinger 1957): First, dissonance occurs when a 
person’s attitudes contradict other attitudes or behaviors. Second, dissonance is an 
aversive state; therefore, a person feels pressure to reduce the dissonance and prevent 
future increases o f  dissonance. And third, a person tries to reduce this aversive state 
through changing behavior and cognition, and avoiding the introduction o f new 
information or opinions that could produce dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance arises in three primary ways (Loudon and Della Bitta 1993):
1. Any logical inconsistency can create a sense o f dissonance.
2. Dissonance occurs when people experience an inconsistency either between
their attitude versus their behavior or between two types o f  their behavior.
3. Dissonance can take place when strongly held beliefs or expectations are
disconfirmed.
Interestingly, Hasan and Nasreen (2002) suggest that cognitive dissonance is not 
automatic in each o f these modes o f dissonance provocation. For dissonance to occur, a 
consumer must perceive the inconsistency.
In consumer behavior, the dominant view is that dissonance occurs once a 
decision has been made. For example, before making a decision choice, consumers still 
have the option o f adjusting their purchase behavior to match their given attitude toward 
a product, brand, or service. However, a commitment is established between consumers 
and sellers when consumers have made their final decision. Thus, the restriction o f 
having made a buyer-seller commitment does not allow consumers to adjust their
20
behavior further and forces them to stick to their decision. The described situation may 
eventually bring about feelings o f  dissonance for consumers, especially when they are not 
pleased with their decision choice after purchase (e.g. buyer’s remorse).
To summarize, dissonance and consonance are relations among a person’s 
cognitions that can be among opinions, beliefs, knowledge o f one’s environment, and 
knowledge o f one's own actions and feelings. Consonance exists when two opinions, 
beliefs, or items o f  knowledge are consistent and fit with each other. On the other hand, 
dissonance is invoked when two opinions, beliefs, or items o f knowledge are inconsistent 
or do not fit together. Festinger (1957, 1964) mentioned three ways (not mutually 
exclusive) that a person might try to cope with instances o f cognitive dissonance:
1. Changing consonant factors (e.g. by changing one or more o f the beliefs, 
opinions, or behaviors involved in the dissonance).
2. Adding consonant factors (e.g. by obtaining new information or acquiring new 
beliefs that will increase the existing consonance to help reduce the total 
dissonance).
3. Lowering the importance o f  dissonant factors (e.g. by reducing and perhaps 
forgetting the importance o f dissonant cognitions).
Self as Information Processing Filter
Aronson (1968) modified dissonance theory by emphasizing the role o f  the self. 
He declared that “ [if] dissonance exists, then it is the result o f cognitions inconsistent 
with the self-concept” (1968, 23). Robins, Tracy, and Trzesniewski (2008) proposed that 
the two aspects o f the self, i.e. self-awareness and self-representation, are evolved 
mechanisms that serve four adaptive functions: self-regulation, information processing
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filter, understanding others, and identity formation. They suggest that these four functions 
have helped people to survive, reproduce, and attain social status and acceptance in 
increasingly complex social environments. With regards to the self as an information- 
processing filter, it is virtually impossible for people to attend to and encode all o f the 
information that is constantly bombarding them. Hence, the self attends to this problem 
by serving as a filter, or lens, through which people experience the world around them. 
People’s self-representations consist o f cognitive structures, or schemas, that organize 
and direct the processing o f information. Therefore, Robins, Tracy, and Trzesniewski 
(2008) suggest that the self serves as a top-down information filter that is guided by four 
basic motives: accuracy, consistency, popularity (i.e., social status and acceptance), and 
enhancement. These basic motives are purported to influence which information the self 
attends to, encodes, retrieves, and acts upon. They describe the motivational orientations 
in terms o f  four metaphors: the scientist, the politician, the egotist, and the consistency 
seeker.
The scientist metaphor illustrates people’s desire to obtain accurate information 
about themselves and the world, i.e. striving for “truth” . The politician metaphor suggests 
that people try to present themselves in ways that make the best impressions on others to 
enhance their own social status and acceptance. The egotist metaphor entails that people 
narcissistically distort information to enhance their own self-worth. The consistency 
seeker metaphor, according to Swann (1997), describes people as striving to see 
themselves in a consistent manner by confirming their preexisting self-views regardless 
o f reality.
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Robins, Tracy, and Trzesniewski (2008) contend that there is sufficient evidence 
to suggest that a person may actively seek out and create contexts in which his/her self­
view will be confirmed even when these views are inaccurate or negative. One can 
clearly see how the functions o f the self in general and the motivations for the self as an 
information processing filter in particular can be used to explain the reality o f 
confirmation bias and incidences o f  belief perseverance. Hence, consistency seeking may 
cause people to make serious information processing errors, but this blunder is purported 
to be a useful and efficient heuristic for people living in increasingly complex social 
environments.
What does all o f that mean for the interaction between buyer and seller? In the 
contemporary marketplace, consumers are faced with a plethora o f information on the 
seemingly endless choices o f available products and services. Faced with such huge 
display choices, consumers could forgo a deeper cognitive reasoning to save time and, 
instead, rely more on habits or heuristics to make a quick, thoughtless choice. This 
presents a major problem when marketers need to communicate new information 
containing substantial evidence that would change consumer belief-expectancies.
Research Paradigms o f Cognitive Dissonance
Harmon-Jones (2002) discusses four research paradigms that have been used to 
examine cognitive dissonance processes: Free Choice (Brehm 1956), Induced 
Compliance (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959), Belief Disconfirmation (Festinger, Riecken,
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and Schachter, 1956), and Hypocrisy (Aronson, Fried, and Stone, 1991). See Figure 2.1 
for a depiction o f these paradigms o f dissonance research in relation to confirmation bias 
and belief perseverance.
Free Choice Paradigm
People make all kind o f decisions on a daily basis. Festinger (1957) asserted that 
decision-making almost always provokes dissonance. Once a person makes a decision to 
choose one alternative over another, he/she will have to cope with the cognitive elements 
concerning the attractive attributes o f  the rejected alternatives.
The free choice paradigm (Brehm 1956) focuses on this notion that dissonance is 
provoked in decision-making and that harder (easier) decisions stimulate more (less) 
dissonance. This affective-motivational state o f  dissonance is lessened by viewing the 
selected (not selected) alternative or choice as more (less) desirable, i.e. the “spreading o f 
the alternatives.”
Changing one’s behavior is one o f the ways to reduce dissonance that can occur 
from making a decision (Festinger, 1964). Consequently, behavior change can often be 
very difficult to do. For that reason, people might employ various mental maneuvers 
instead o f  changing their behavior. In the free choice paradigm, the “spreading o f the 
alternatives” refers to one o f these common mental maneuvers to reduce dissonance. 
Thus, people reduce their dissonance from decision making by increasing the 
attractiveness o f  a chosen alternative and decreasing the attractiveness o f a rejected 
alternative.
One o f  the pioneering studies to examine the relationship between dissonance and 
decision-making was conducted by Brehm (1956). Female subjects were informed that
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they would be helping out in a study funded by several manufacturers. They were also 
informed that they would receive one o f  the products at the end o f  the experiment as 
compensation. Eight household products, including an automatic coffee maker, an 
electric sandwich grill, an automatic toaster, and a portable radio, were rated on their 
desirability. The products ranged in price from $15 to $30.
Subjects in the control group were given one o f the products. Hence, these 
subjects did not have any dissonance to reduce since they did not have to make a 
decision. Subjects in the low-dissonance group were asked to choose between a desirable 
product and a less desirable one that was rated three points lower on an 8-point Likert 
scale. In the high-dissonance treatment group, subjects were asked to choose between a 
highly desirable product and one rated just a point lower on the same scale. The subjects 
were asked to rate the products once more after reading reports about the household 
products.
Behm (1956) found that subjects in the high-dissonance group were significantly 
more likely to increase the attractiveness o f  the chosen alternative and to decrease the 
attractiveness o f  the not chosen alternative than subjects in the other two treatment 
groups (low-dissonance and control). Thus, Behm (1956) provided support for “spreading 
o f the alternatives” by subjects in the high-dissonance condition.
As discussed previously, decision-making involves the rejection o f alternatives. 
Thus, cognitive dissonance theory predicts that consumer decision-making will 
sometimes lead to post-purchase dissonance. Two factors determine the possibility and 
the extent o f  the dissonance experienced from making a decision: the importance o f  the 
decision and the relative attractiveness o f the rejected alternative (Oshikawa 1969). More
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specifically, consumer decisions o f greater (lesser) importance and more (less) attractive 
rejected alternatives will lead to greater (lesser) dissonance. According to Oshikawa 
(1969), a variation o f dissonance theory suggests that consumers who consider a greater 
(lesser) number o f alternatives and/or alternatives with more (less) equal positive and 
negative attributes before purchase will experience greater (lesser) post-purchase 
dissonance.
Induced Compliance Paradigm  
The induced, or forced, compliance paradigm (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959) 
assumes that dissonance occurs when an individual does or says something that 
contradicts his or her prior belief or attitude. Thus, people sometimes behave in a manner 
that is inconsistent with their beliefs. Why would a person behave this way? He/she may 
be induced to do so via external justifications such as certain promises o f reward or 
threats o f  punishment. Greater dissonance is the result o f a person’s contradictory actions 
when these external justifications are few and unimportant (and vice-versa).
For example, people sometimes find themselves in a situation where they are 
publicly forced to do something that they privately do not want to do. When that happens, 
dissonance is created between a person’s cognition and a person’s behavior, i.e. “ I did not 
want to do this” versus “I did it.” Since the behavior is irreversible, dissonance may be 
reduced by re-evaluating attitudes toward the behavior.
In an interesting experiment, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) investigated if 
cognitive dissonance could be created through induced compliance behavior by forcing 
people to perform a dull task. To create a series o f very boring tasks, Festinger and 
Carlsmith (1959) requested male subjects to put pegs in a peg board and remove them for
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30 minutes. Then, the subjects were asked to turn pegs clockwise for another 30 minutes. 
Needless to say, subjects’ attitudes toward these tasks were extremely negative. 
Afterward, the subjects were paid either $1 or $20 to tell a waiting participant that the 
boring tasks were really interesting, i.e. to tell a lie. The control group was not paid or 
asked to lie. Virtually all o f the subjects told the lie that the boring experiment was 
enjoyable and fun. Lastly, subjects were asked to rate the dull tasks on enjoyment to 
reveal how they coped with their dissonance.
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) predicted that subjects would suffer dissonance 
due to the contradiction between their negative attitudes o f the boring task and their 
actions (lying). The experimenters found that subjects in the control group and the $20 
dollar group rated the tasks as boring. On the other hand, subjects in the $ 1 group rated 
the dull tasks as significantly more interesting and enjoyable.
Results from Festinger and Carlsm ith’s (1959) study revealed that subjects who 
received $1 to lie resolved the dissonance created by their initial negative attitudes 
toward the boring task and their actions by rating the experiment as pleasant. Since the 
high monetary reward justified their actions o f  dishonesty, subjects who received $20 did 
not experience as much dissonance. Hence, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) suggested 
that, due to the lack o f a strong external reward, subjects in the $1 group were forced to 
change their attitudes to relieve the cognitive tension caused by the conflict between their 
attitudes and behaviors.
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In a true market setting, a consumer is not forced to make a purchase. Consumers 
will try their best not to behave in ways which they know will later arouse dissonance. 
Hence, the induced compliance paradigm of research is not likely to cause consumers to 
experience post-purchase dissonance (Oshikawa, 1969).
B elie f Disconfirmation Paradigm
The belief disconfirmation paradigm (Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter, 1956) 
proposes that dissonance arises when people are exposed to information that is 
inconsistent with their beliefs. Dissonance can be reduced by changing previously held 
beliefs. For people who do not change their beliefs, the unresolved dissonance may lead 
to 1) misperceiving or misinterpreting information, 2) rejecting or refuting the 
information, 3) looking for support from those who agree with them or have the same 
belief, and 4) trying to persuade others to accept their belief.
Adams (1961) conducted an experiment to test two hypotheses concerning the 
reduction o f cognitive dissonance by seeking information. The first hypothesis predicts 
that people exposed to disconfirming opinions are more likely to seek information 
compared to people exposed to compatible, confirming communication. The second 
hypothesis predicts that people exposed to disconfirming communication tend to seek 
confirming opinions from other sources. In the study by Adams (1961), opinions were 
gathered from mothers regarding the perceived importance o f hereditary and 
environmental factors in raising children. The subjects were then exposed to substantial 
communication that advocated either a hereditary or an environmental point o f view. The
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results supported the first hypothesis but failed to support the second hypothesis. Thus, 
people exposed to belief disconfirmations may experience an increased level cognitive 
dissonance which in turn causes them to search for additional information.
Many factors come into play in determining whether disconfirming evidence will 
arouse consumer dissonance. According to Oshikawa (1969), the most important o f these 
factors is the degree o f  commitment and ego-involvement. For example, when a 
consumer makes a perceived good choice and  publicly commits to that choice, he or she 
will experience even greater dissonance when exposed to disconfirming information.
Some research suggests that dissonance is unlikely to arise when the degree o f 
public ego-involvement is low and when disconfirming information is not salient (Cohen, 
Brehm, and Latane 1959; Rosen 1961). Cohen, Brehm, and Latane (1959) argued that 
making a public commitment leads to ego-involvement. Consequently, this ego- 
involvement increases the importance o f the consonant cognitive elements on which 
people base their choices, making them even more committed. Hence, making public 
commitments can increase the magnitude o f  dissonance by also increasing the importance 
o f peoples’ dissonant cognitions.
Rosen (1961) examined the effect o f  cognitive dissonance on opinion-seeking 
behavior and suggested that people tend to seek the opinions o f others regardless o f their 
own opinions. Results revealed that roughly two-thirds o f the subjects who were asked to 
make private decisions (without announcing publicly) sought dissonance-producing 
information regarding their decisions. The remaining one-third o f  the subjects sought 
dissonance-reducing information. The behavior o f  the latter group coincides more with
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predictions that would be made by the confirmation bias. In addition, Rosen suggested 
that the tendency to reduce cognitive dissonance relates to the tendency to avoid risks.
Hypocrisy Paradigm  
In the hypocrisy research paradigm (Aronson, Fried, and Stone, 1991), people are 
induced to make a public attitudinally consistent statement and are then reminded o f all 
the times they did not “practice what they preach.” Dissonance is reduced either by acting 
in accordance to the statement or by changing their attitudes to be more consistent with 
past behavior. Fried (1998) suggested that the chosen option depends on whether the 
recent statement or past behavior was more resistant to change.
Aronson, Fried, and Stone (1991) conducted an experiment that asked sexually 
active young adults to develop a speech promoting the use o f  condoms from a set o f 
facts. The speech was supposedly intended for AIDS prevention o f high school students. 
The subjects were randomly assigned either to “preach” or “no preach” conditions. That 
is, they either delivered the speech in front o f  a television camera, or they silently 
rehearsed the speech without actually delivering it.
Subjects in the “high mindful” conditions were asked to fully described occasions 
in their past when they had unprotected sex. The other half o f  the subjects in the “ low 
mindful” conditions simply preached or did not preach (silently rehearsed) without any 
reference to their own sexual behavior. Lastly, the subjects reported their level o f condom 
use in the past as well as their level o f intention to use condoms in the future.
Results from the experiment indicated that subjects in the hypocrisy condition 
(preach/high mindful) reported the highest levels o f previous risk behavior, i.e. failure to 
use condoms in the past. Aronson, Fried, and Stone (1991) argued that their procedure to
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induce hypocrisy had enabled subjects to overcome denial. This finding is interesting 
because it is contrary to predictions from dissonance theory. The young adults in the 
hypocrisy group should have felt the greatest dissonance-based pressure to under rate 
their risk behavior.
A ceiling effect was seen when subjects in all conditions reported strong intention 
to use condoms in the future. Aronson, Fried, and Stone (1991) called subjects three 
months after the experiment and asked them to report recent condom use. Even though 
many o f the subjects could not be located, a considerable difference in the size o f means 
was found. Consequently, the researchers argued that hypocrisy induction might be the 
most effective route to long-term changes in behavior.
O f the four research paradigms o f cognitive dissonance discussed, the belief 
disconfirmation paradigm is epitomized by the confirmation bias. As seen in Figure 2.1, 
in addition to belief perseverance, confirmation bias is also used to explain attitude 
polarization and illusory correlation.
Attitude Polarization
Attitude polarization is the phenomenon in which a difference o f  opinions among 
people becomes more extreme as separate parties consider evidence on a particular issue. 
Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) exposed subjects that supported or opposed capital 
punishment to two case studies that confirmed and disconfirmed their existing beliefs 
about how effective the death penalty is as a crime deterrence. The researchers found that 
subjects' decisions about whether to accept a study's findings at face value or to search for
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flaws and consider alternative interpretations depended far more on whether the study's 
results coincided with their existing beliefs than on the particular procedure employed in 
the study.
Illusory Correlation
Illusory correlation is the perception o f  a relationship between two variables 
which, in reality, does not exist (Peeters 1983). Hamilton and Rose (1980) conducted a 
series o f three experiments to test the notion o f illusory correlation in the context o f 
stereotypes. Subjects were asked to read sets o f sentences that contained pairs o f trait 
adjectives to describe people o f different occupations. For instance, a doctor is described 
using consistent trait adjectives such as "thoughtful" and "wealthy," while a stewardess is 
described in the same stereotypical manner using the words "attractive" and "comforting" 
as consistent trait adjectives.
In the first two experiments, the trait adjectives were either consistent with 
occupational stereotypes or not related to the stereotype. The researchers found that 
subjects overestimated information congruent with their stereotypic expectations even 
though the frequency o f  the consistent and unrelated trait adjectives was the same. In the 
third experiment, Hamilton and Rose (1980) conducted a similar design employing 
inconsistent (instead o f  consistent) and unrelated trait adjectives. Results revealed that 
subjects estimated that inconsistent trait adjectives occurred significantly less frequently 
than unrelated traits. Thus, subjects’ assessments were once again biased toward 
maintaining their existing stereotype beliefs.
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Consumer Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance has been studied extensively across disciplines, particularly 
in the realm o f post-purchase consumer behavior (Ehrlich et al. 1957; Bell 1967; Hunt 
1970; Sweeney, Hausknecht, and Soutar 2000). Consumer dissonance, in particular, has 
become a focal point for marketing researchers. For example, marketing research has 
examined the interplay between dissonance and brand loyalty (Cohen and Houston 1972), 
cognitive effect o f advertisements post-purchase (Engel 1963), and the impact on service 
quality perceptions (O'Neill and Palmer 2004). Thus, a review o f some key marketing 
research findings on post-purchase dissonance is warranted.
Straits (1964) illustrates that dissonance can be provoked in consumers in two 
ways; post-decision and via cognitive intrusion. Consumers faced with making a choice 
among many alternatives often weigh the advantages and disadvantages o f each. After 
making a decision, consumers may experience cognitive discomfort if  disequilibrium 
exists between the chosen and rejected alternatives. For example, a consumer may prefer 
and buy a high-performance sports car, but still value the extra space that could have 
been afforded by a larger car. Thus, in this case, either choice carries opportunity costs 
that may evolve into dissonance (Straits 1964).
Similarly, cognitive intrusion may create dissonance for consumers. When 
consumers are exposed to new information that contradicts their current behavior, they 
may experience dissonance as a result. For example, anti-smoking campaigns aim to 
intrude on the psyche o f smokers or potential smokers by presenting additional evidence 
o f  the harmful effects o f tobacco products. The mental discomfort formed from the 
discrepant information is intended to discourage future consumption o f tobacco products.
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Bell (1967) examined consumers’ feelings o f dissonance (buyer’s remorse) 
following the purchase o f a new car. The researchers conducted personal interviews with 
new car buyers ranging from one to eight days after the car purchase. Contrary to 
previous studies, Bell’s (1967) findings did not provide immediate support for an 
association between persuasibility and cognitive dissonance. However, once a control 
was set in place for the self-confidence o f  buyers, Bell (1967) found significant 
relationships between persuasibility and cognitive dissonance. That is, car buyers with 
high (low) self-confidence exhibited high (low) levels o f dissonance if  they were easily 
persuaded to buy a car. Moreover, car buyers who perceived that they received high 
quality o f service experienced less cognitive dissonance. More specifically, buyers who 
were moderately persuaded received the worst service, and consequently, these buyers 
are the ones who experienced the most cognitive dissonance. Bell (1967) suggests that 
highly confident buyers generally prefer to make their own decisions, and dissonance 
may arise if  they perceive coercion in the buying experience. Customers with low self- 
confidence may need to rely on salespeople to help them make decisions, and dissonance 
can arise afterward as a result.
In recent research by Sweeney, Hausknecht, and Soutar (2000), results indicate 
that cognitive dissonance contains both cognitive and psychological (or emotional) 
components. They define the cognitive aspect as “a person’s recognition that beliefs are 
inconsistent with a decision after the purchase has been made” (2000, 374). The 
emotional aspect o f  cognitive dissonance is defined as “a person’s psychological 
discomfort subsequent to the purchase decision” (2000, 375). Sweeney et al.’s (2000) 
cognitive dissonance after purchase scale contains three dimensions. One o f the
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dimensions is emotional, while the other two dimensions (wisdom o f purchase and 
concern over deal) are cognitive. The authors describe wisdom o f purchase as the 
consumer post-purchase recognition that he/she did not need the product or did not 
choose the right one. On the other hand, ‘concern over deal’ is the post-purchase 
perception that salespeople might have influenced the purchase decision in a way that is 
against the custom er’s own beliefs.
For the most part, previous (and subsequent) marketing research on cognitive 
dissonance has been limited to dissonance in post-purchase situations. However, 
dissonance for a consumer may also arise prior to making a decision. For example, 
consider a consumer that holds strong beliefs about a particular product (or service, 
brand, etc.) and has been continually buying the product based on this belief. Dissonance 
may occur if  the consumer is exposed to disconfirming evidence regarding his/her 
product beliefs, particularly if  this information originates from a credible source. How is 
a consumer to react?
A rational consumer may react to disconfirming evidence by changing his/her 
beliefs and buying behavior. However, according to Edward Chamberlin (1957, 60), 
“there is no reason to assume that human beings always act perfectly rationally; indeed, 
there is good reason not to assume it.” Godden (2012), among others, contended that 
belief perseverance is an irrational behavior. Thus, it is extremely difficult to predict the 
reactions and the behaviors o f an individual consumer. Due to confirmation bias, a 
consumer’s beliefs may persist despite the exposure to new, considerable disconfirming 
information. What is the reason for this irrationality and perseverance o f  beliefs? Can 
belief perseverance still have an effect on the consum er’s ensuing purchase behavior?
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Individuals resist changing their attitudes because o f an inherent commitment to 
that attitude. Pomerantz, Chaiken, and Tordesillas (1995) argue that people who are 
committed to a certain attitude feel confident that their attitude is correct and tend to 
vigorously defend their position. Hence, people with such firm stances are less likely to 
change their attitudes. Results from this study reveal that deeply held commitments or 
beliefs may trigger resistance mechanisms that reject contradicting evidence when 
presented. Similarly, it may be that consumers that are highly involved with a 
product/brand/service may discount the credibility o f any information that contradicts 
their belief system.
Beliefs, Attitudes, and Knowledge
The relationship between consumer thought and actions has captivated marketing 
researchers for decades. Accumulated evidence suggests that consumer beliefs and 
attitudes have a direct impact on purchase behaviors (Seines and Granhaug 1986; Feick, 
Park, and Mothersbaugh 1992). Beliefs represent consumers’ perceived probability o f 
existence regarding some distinguishable aspect o f the world encompassing their 
subjective understanding o f  themselves and their environment (Fishbein and Ajzen 
1975). The authors propose that reasoned action is driven by subjective judgments 
regarding the likelihood o f a relationship between a belief and some other object, value, 
concept, or attribute. A person’s salient beliefs are those that are activated from memory 
and considered important in a given context. Thus, attitudes are expressed as a function 
o f a person’s salient beliefs in a given situation.
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), there are three different processes that 
underlie belief formation. These processes entail the formation o f  descriptive, inferential,
36
and informational beliefs. A descriptive belief is described as a perceived relationship 
between the object o f  a belief and some object (O and X, respectively) that is established 
via direct observation. An inferential belief is described as a link between O and X that is 
established via a process o f inference from another belief about O. Lastly, an information 
belief is described as a link between O and X that develops via pertinent information that 
may be accepted from an outside source (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).
The summary o f associations can help illustrate the theory o f reasoned action in a 
simple manner: Beliefs o  Attitudes ^  Intentions ■=> Behavior. For example, think about 
the statement: “we intend to help people we like.” If we believe that someone is a good 
person, then we will have a favorable attitude toward that person. As a result, we will 
have greater intentions to help that person should the need arise. Finally, the greater our 
intentions are to help, the more likely we are to actually help that person. Not 
surprisingly, typical marketing studies based on the theory o f reasoned action focus 
mainly on consumer beliefs regarding product attributes and subsequent consumer 
attitudes toward brands and intentions to buy.
The theory o f  planned behavior (Ajzen 1988) suggests that the combination o f 
three factors, i.e. attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral 
control, lead to the formation o f a behavioral intention, and this intention is presumed to 
be a direct antecedent o f behavior. The theory o f planned behavior differs from the theory 
o f reasoned action in that it includes perceived behavioral control as an additional 
determinant o f intentions and behavior. Thus, the theory o f reasoned action (predecessor 
theory) is a reduced version o f the theory o f  planned behavior and is appropriate when 
perceived behavioral control is inappropriate to the context at hand.
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Both o f these theories, i.e. the theory o f  reasoned action and the theory o f  planned 
behavior, are rooted in the expectancy-value model. This model makes three fundamental 
predictions (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Firstly, people react to new information about 
something by developing a belief about that something. Secondly, people assign certain 
values to each attribute that their belief is based on. Thirdly, people form or modify their 
belief-expectancies based on their subjective assessment o f value. Observe that the 
expectancy-value model assumes that existing beliefs can and most likely will be 
modified by new information. As mentioned previously, this is not the same prediction 
that can be made in the case o f belief perseverance. Due to the confirmation bias, 
adamant consumers will more than likely dismiss novel information that is contrary to 
their beliefs.
Subjective vs. Objective Knowledge
Brucks (1985) identifies three categories o f consumer product class knowledge: 
subjective knowledge, objective knowledge, and prior experience. Subjective knowledge 
is the consum er’s perception o f how much he or she knows, i.e. self-rated or self-assessed 
knowledge. Objective knowledge is what a consumer actually knows. Finally, prior 
experience pertains to a consumer’s previous purchasing or usage experience with the 
product.
According to Brucks (1985), the prior experience category is inconsistent with the 
information processing paradigm. The information processing paradigm maintains that 
only an experience that results in differences in memory can affect behavior. Behaviors 
are likely to vary from one consumer to the next since consumers can learn different 
things from similar experiences. Hence, Brucks (1985) argues that measures o f subjective
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and objective knowledge are more directly linked to behavior compared to measures o f 
knowledge based on prior experience. Additionally, she declares that this is particularly 
true for product classes in which habit is not a major factor.
Various researchers have shown that a consumer’s subjective knowledge and 
objective knowledge do not necessarily correlate in a perfect manner (Seines and 
Granhaug 1986; Klerck and Sweeney 2007). Consequently, measures o f subjective and 
objective knowledge can have very different effects on information processing and 
subsequent purchase behavior. Thus, researchers have recommended that close attention 
should be given to the differences between each o f these measures (Seines and Granhaug 
1986; Klerck and Sweeney 2007). More specifically, the appropriate measure should be 
selected according to the focus o f  the research. For instance, Seines and Granhaug 1986 
argue that subjective knowledge measures are preferable when concentrating on 
motivational aspects o f product knowledge. On the other hand, objective knowledge 
measures, they argue, are more appropriate for studies that focus on ability differences of 
consumers.
Demographic variables can be influential factors in shaping a consum er’s 
knowledge. For example, researchers have found that higher levels o f education are 
positively related to higher levels o f organic food knowledge (Ellen 1994; Gracia and De 
Magistris 2007). In addition, following an examination o f the relationship between 
knowledge and pro-ecological behaviors, Ellen (1994) found that higher income and 
younger age are positively related to both subjective and objective knowledge.
Researchers have suggested that subjective knowledge, in comparison to objective 
knowledge, offers a stronger motivation for subsequent purchase behavior (Seines and
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Granhaug 1986; Feick, Park, and Mothersbaugh 1992). For example, Chryssochoidis 
(2000) and Gracia and De Magistris (2007) found that consumers with higher levels o f 
subjective knowledge o f organic food have significantly greater intentions to buy organic 
food. Gracia and De Magistris (2007) argue that a consumer’s knowledge is the only tool 
available to differentiate organic product attributes from conventional product attributes 
and to form positive attitudes toward the organic product category. Consumers with weak 
perceived self-competence in a particular product category will feel incapable o f making 
a good choice. As a result, these consumers will probably shy away from that product 
category all together (Chryssochoidis 2000). Results in Thogersen (2007) support this 
notion by revealing that consumer uncertainty has direct, negative effects on intentions to 
buy organic food and on actual purchasing o f organic food.
To summarize, objective knowledge and subjective knowledge are terms used to 
differentiate between a consum er’s actual knowledge and a consumer’s assessment o f  his 
or her knowledge, respectively. Objective knowledge exists as accurately stored 
information, while subjective knowledge refers to self-beliefs about the consum er’s own 
knowledge (Moorman et al. 2004). This dissertation focuses on the subjective beliefs of 
consumers. That is, the study will attempt to provoke consumers’ subjective beliefs with 
disconfirming evidence in order to examine these potentially significant effects on 
purchase-related behavioral intentions o f the consumers.
Persuasion Models and Inoculation Theory
There are numerous models o f persuasion known to marketing. Examples o f 
common persuasion models include the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty, Cacioppo 
and Schumann 1983), the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Chaiken 1980), and the
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Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad and Wright 1994). According to Meyers-Levy 
and Malaviya (1999), persuasion does not necessarily rest within information; rather, 
successful persuasion depends on the mental processes invoked by information. Hence, 
persuasion models have much to offer in examining belief change but have little to offer 
in regards to answering the “why” question in the case o f belief perseverance. That is, 
persuasion models such as the aforementioned ELM, HSM, and PKM can provide 
explanations for instances o f  belief change but fail to explain why people do not modify 
their beliefs in the presence o f disconfirming (and convincing) evidence.
Inoculation theory (McGuire 1961) is a theory that explains how to keep original 
beliefs consistent in the face o f counterarguments. Hence, the theory is essentially 
opposite to persuasion. That is, unlike traditional persuasion models, inoculation theory 
does not focus on describing the processes that lead to persuasion. Instead, the theory 
focuses on explaining how people can build a resistance to persuasive influence. 
McGuire (1961) suggested that beliefs and attitudes that are commonly held and seldom 
attacked would be most vulnerable to attack, because people would be unprepared to 
defend them. He called these ubiquitously shared beliefs “cultural truisms” (Szabo and 
Pfau 2002).
According to Szabo and Pfau (2002), inoculation theory is founded on the notion 
o f selective exposure. Therefore, the theory has a fundamental relation to cognitive 
confirmation bias and perhaps an insightful one as well. As mentioned previously, 
confirmation bias deals with biased search, interpretation, and memory. Selective 
exposure, like confirmation bias, assumes that people will be attracted to information 
that supports their beliefs/attitudes, and they will purposely avoid information that
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disagrees with their beliefs/attitudes (Szabo and Pfau 2002). One can see how the two 
terms, i.e. confirmation bias and selective exposure, have sometimes been used 
interchangeably in research.
Inoculation theory assumes that counterarguments that challenge people’s beliefs 
and attitudes will threaten them. Thus, the theory consists o f two main components: 
threat and refutational preemption (Szabo and Pfau, 2002). The threat is what motivates 
a person to protect his or her beliefs and attitudes. Refutational preemption involves 
activating a person’s argument against systematic belief attacks and strengthening (or 
inoculating, immunizing, etc.) his or her existing beliefs via expression.
Researchers have demonstrated the usefulness o f inoculation techniques for the 
betterment o f society (Pfau, Bockem and King 1992; Goldbold and Pfau 2000; 
Compton and Pfau 2004). Pfau, Bockem and Kang (1992) used inoculation to promote a 
resistance to start smoking in adolescent children. Godbold and Pfau (2000) showed that 
the inoculation approach can be used to lower the effects o f peer pressure and early 
alcohol consumption. Compton and Pfau (2004) employed the inoculation technique to 
help protect college students against the dangers o f credit card abuse.
Inoculation techniques o f building immunity to persuasion can perhaps be applied 
in circumstances o f belief disconfirmation to create a more favorable reception o f 
beneficial counterarguments. For example, research shows that people drastically 
underestimate caloric content o f food from so called “healthy” fast-food chains (e.g. 
Subway) compared to other restaurants (e.g. M cDonald’s) (Chandon and Wansink, 
2007). In fact, consumers estimated that 1,000-calorie Subway meal contains over 20% 
less calories than a 1,000-calorie meal at McDonald's. Therefore, people are more likely
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to feel more at ease to order additional side dishes and/or desserts at a “healthy” 
restaurant compared to one that is perceived as not so healthy. This phenomenon is 
commonly referred to as the “health halo.” Chandon and Wansink (2007) suggest that the 
harmful effect o f health halos can be diminished by simply asking people to reflect on 
whether the opposite o f  such health claims are true. Perhaps this technique can be applied 
to help overcome instances o f erroneous belief perseverance.
Assimilation-Contrast Theory
Assimilation-contrast theorists assert that consumers’ susceptibility to belief 
change depends on their latitudes o f acceptance and rejection to various stands on the 
issue (Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif 1957). For instance, consumers tend to assimilate or 
accept (contrast or reject) advertised prices based on correspondence with their internal 
price range. Olson and Dover (1976) argue that cognitive dissonance theory and 
assimilation contrast theory generally make the same predictions but tend to produce 
differing predictions for belief disconfirmations o f great magnitude. Inductive reasoning 
suggests that for most consumer products, usage experience would not create the extreme 
disconfirmations required to produce a contrast effect. Olson and Dover (1976) concur 
that beliefs may change after a disconfirming experience and are likely to be triggered by 
dissonance reduction rather than processes o f assimilation. Moreover, the result o f 
contrast is that preexisting beliefs persist unchanged in the face o f new evidence.
Product Involvement
Product involvement is the general level o f interest in a product, or the centrality 
o f a product to the person’s ego-structure (Day 1970). In other words, product
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involvement simply refers to the attributes linked to a certain product that are pertinent to 
a consumer. These attributes can include numerous aspects o f the product including its 
importance, meanings, value, relationship strength, and level o f psychological or 
affective connection (Howard and Sheth 1969; Laurent and Kapferer 1985). For example, 
a product may be more important to or provide more meaning and value for one 
consumer compared to another consumer. Thus, the strength o f the relationship between a 
particular product and a consumer may vary significantly.
According to Laurent and Kapferer (1985), simple predictions can be made 
regarding the effects o f  involvement on consumer behavior. In general, consumers who 
are highly involved are expected to engage in various pre-purchase behaviors like active 
search, extensive evaluation o f alternatives, and active information processing. 
Conversely, there should be much less anticipation for low involvement consumers to 
exhibit the same rigorous pre-purchase behavior.
Product involvement may produce different effects depending on consumer 
income levels. Gbadamosi (2009) conducted a focus group discussion and 30 in-depth 
interviews with low-income female consumers who engage in habitual purchasing. Based 
on qualitative findings, Gbadamosi (2009) purports that low involvement products 
yielded greater post consumption cognitive dissonance compared to high involvement 
products. Thus, purchases involving high-price products such as refrigerators and 
automobiles are not the only type o f  instances that can yield dissonance.
Perceived Value
Perceived value is “the consumer’s overall assessment o f  the utility o f a product 
based on perceptions o f what is received and what is given’’ (Zeithaml 1988, 12).
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Perceived value is so significant to customers that it has been coined “the fundamental 
basis for all marketing activity” (Holbrook 1994, 22). Research suggests that high value 
perception is one o f the primary motivations for customer patronage. For example, results 
from Chang and Wildt (1994) and Gogoi (2013) support the notion that perceived value 
is a key factor influencing purchase intentions. Hence, it is no surprise that a focus on 
value creation has been strongly linked to subsequent profits and loyalty (Khalifa 2004).
Ever since the emergence o f Vargo and Lusch’s (2008) service-dominant logic 
and its core notion o f service as the fundamental basis o f exchange, fewer researchers are 
considering value as it specifically relates to marketing theory and practice. According to 
a review by Babin and James (2010), value has been inauspiciously overlooked by other 
commonly researched outcomes such as satisfaction and loyalty. The key concept o f 
value in marketing research is too critical to be ignored, particularly in this study.
Research suggests that perceived value can be considered both unidimensional 
and multi-faceted in its makeup (Sanchez-Femandez and Iniesta-Bonillo 2007). The 
unidimensional perspective views perceived value as a simple trade-off between benefits 
received and the sacrifices made to obtain such benefits (e.g. see Zeitham l’s definition). 
Other researchers argue that perceived value is a complex, multidimensional construct 
because, in addition to benefits and sacrifices, a variety o f  other notions such as perceived 
quality, price, affect, and social aspects are undeniably embedded in conceptualizations 
o f value (Holbrook 1994; Babin, Darden and Griffin 1994; Sweeney and Soutar 2001). 
Sanchez-Femandez and Iniesta-Bonillo (2007) suggest that both perspectives o f 
perceived value play a role in providing simplified (unidimensional) and complex (multi­
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dimensional) understandings o f the value concept. However, the researchers conclude 
that the nature o f perceived value is complex and multidimensional.
Consumers’ perceived value o f  an offering is likely to be affected when exposed 
to substantial evidence that would influence their beliefs regarding that offering. For 
example, a custom er’s perceived value o f  some product will probably be reinforced if  the 
custom er’s product beliefs are confirmed. Conversely, if  that same customer comes 
across substantial evidence that disconfirms his or her product beliefs, the custom er’s 
perceived value o f that product will conceivably diminish.
Research Hypotheses and Model
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that a person exposed to disconfirming 
evidence tends to become more convinced that his or her original belief is correct and 
may exhibit a greater preference for the original belief (Oshikawa 1970). That is, 
invoking dissonance via exposure to discrepant evidence may not only lead to belief 
perseverance, but may lead to belief enhancement as well. Nonetheless, a person exposed 
to stronger disconfirming evidence will likely recognize greater conflict between that 
evidence and his or her beliefs. Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) suggest that people who 
hold strong beliefs about something are apt to examine relevant evidence in a biased 
manner. Due to the confirmation bias, people with firmly held beliefs are likely to accept 
confirming evidence at face value, but they will subject any disconfirming evidence to 
highly critical evaluation.
Findings in Chang (2011) suggest that claim believability mediates the 
relationship between discomfort and subsequent brand attitudes. That is, discounting 
message believability may be a coping mechanism or a dissonance reduction technique
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that alleviates psychological discomfort. These findings do not come as a surprise since 
previous research suggests that consumers who experience inconsistency between their 
beliefs and new evidence may be less affected if  they discredit the evidence in the first 
place (Anderson, Lepper, and Ross 1980). If the evidence presented is perceived as being 
unbiased and credible (i.e. strong), then a higher level o f belief disconfirmation and 
cognitive dissonance is expected. Consequently, these hypotheses emerge:
Hypothesis 1: Disconfirming evidence exposure will result in more instances o f 
belief perseverance than belief change.
Hypothesis 2: Strong disconfirmations will result in more conflict between 
beliefs and evidence (and more cognitive dissonance) than weak disconfirmations. 
According to Festinger’s (1957) theory o f  cognitive dissonance, a person who 
senses conflicting thoughts will experience discomfort. Furthermore, research has shown 
that messages o f high involvement essentially have greater personal relevance and result 
in greater consequences than messages o f  low involvement (Petty and Cacioppo 1979; 
Petty, Cacioppo and Schumann 1983). Thus, evidence containing salient information on a 
product will elicit a more personal connection for a person who is highly involved. 
Moreover, a highly involved person is expected to engage in more active information 
processing compared to a person who is not as involved (Laurent and Kapferer 1985). 
Therefore, when people are involved with a particular product, they will likely experience 
more intense feelings o f  dissonance as a result o f  their conflicting thoughts. People who 
are less involved with a product are not expected to be as concerned.
Hypothesis 3: Belief disconfirmation is positively related to consumer 
dissonance.
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Hypothesis 4: Product involvement moderates the relationship between belief 
disconfirmation and dissonance, such that the relationship will be stronger for 
subjects with high product involvement than subjects with low product 
involvement.
People who experience dissonance due to belief disconfirmations are expected to 
show less enthusiasm in their subsequent purchase-related behaviors. If disconfirming a 
consumer’s subjective beliefs regarding a product o f interest generates sufficient 
dissonance, then this dissonance will ultimately affect the consum er’s intention to buy 
that product in the future. Moreover, it is perhaps even less likely that the dissonant 
consumer will be willing to pay more for a premium product involved in the belief 
disconfirmation.
Research suggests that the intention to express word-of-mouth is related to 
consumer perceptions o f  value and quality (Hartline and Jones 1996). Consequently, 
higher perceptions o f value and quality increase the likelihood o f expressing positive 
word-of-mouth. Hartline and Jones (1996) found that o f the two correlates, value is more 
influential. Certain attributes o f a product can be central to the overall perceived value o f 
the product. People who have had their beliefs pertaining to these key attributes o f the 
products they buy disconfirmed are expected to engage less in positive word-of-mouth 
compared to people who have had their beliefs confirmed.
Hypothesis 5: Consumer dissonance is negatively related to perceived value. 
Hypothesis 6: Perceived value is positively related to a) purchase intention and 
b) word o f mouth.
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 (RQ1) will be tested via analysis o f variance (ANOVA). To 
test Hypotheses 3 through 6 (RQ2), the model o f effects following evidence exposure 
(seen in Figure 2.2) will be examined using structural equation modeling and hierarchical 
multiple linear regression. A qualitative instrument will be employed to investigate RQ3. 
Details regarding the research design overview and the measurement instruments utilized 




















The research assesses whether robust, disconfirming evidence influences 
consumer beliefs regarding the perceived benefits o f  organic food consumption. The 
investigation attempts to induce a state o f  dissonance via belief disconfirmation and also 
evaluates salient marketing outcomes including perceived value, purchase intention, and 
word-of-mouth. The last phase o f the research consists o f a qualitative investigation 
which attempts to discover possible reasons why consumers might persist in their 
inaccurate beliefs despite being exposed to substantial disconfirming evidence.
The research employs a two (type o f evidence: confirming vs. disconfirming) x 
two (evidence credibility: high vs. low) x two (number o f informational elements / 
reasons: one vs. three) between subjects experimental design. A survey instrument is 
created using established scales in marketing and psychology literature (see Appendix B 
for all employed measurement instruments). Data is collected from both current and 
former students at Louisiana Tech University.
The study utilizes a two-step analytical approach (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). 
An overall measurement model is developed to examine the reliability and the validity o f 
the constructs o f  interest using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Hypotheses 1 is 
tested through the assessment o f qualitative responses.
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Hypothesis 2 is tested via ANOVA. Structural equations modeling is then be 
employed to test the hypothesized model relationships (H3-H6) in AMOS 20. A test o f 
moderation is conducted using hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis.
Next, a qualitative assessment will examine consumers’ open-ended statements 
containing explanations o f belief perseverance (as well as instances o f belief change). It 
is anticipated that the content analysis should help identify recurring themes about 
consumer adamancy and thus offer important insights. Moreover, a qualitative evaluation 
will conceivably provide a basis for a future scale development regarding the proclivity 
to belief perseverance.
Studies that involve multiple measurements might increase the potential for 
demand characteristics. According to Sawyer (1975), using repeated measures o f belief 
or attitude change is especially prone to demand bias. To determine the biasing potential 
o f  such demand bias, the subjects are asked for their opinion o f the study’s purpose at the 
end o f  the survey instrument.
Context o f Study and Pre-test Context
The research uses organic food as a study context. A report by Demeritt (2002) 
suggests that one main reason for American consumers not buying organic food is lack o f 
knowledge and awareness. More specifically, almost 60% of the respondents stated that 
they have never considered buying organic products because they did not know about 
them. Since the early 2000s, and with the continuously growing consumer interest and 
popularity o f the organic food sector, this percentage o f American consumers who have 
never purchased organic foods has decreased substantially. To highlight one o f the key
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statistics reported by the Organic Trade Association (OTA) in 2014, it is estimated that 
over 80% percent o f  American families purchase organic food, at least sometimes.
The decision to choose organic food as a context for this study is not arbitrary. In 
addition to the overwhelmingly optimistic organic food sector growth statistics cited 
previously, researchers have suggested that a substantial degree o f ego-involvement with 
a product may be necessary for disconfirmation effects to be clearly indicated (Cohen and 
Goldberg 1970; Anderson 1973). Generally speaking, “green” consumers or people who 
buy “green” are thought to attach a great deal o f involvement to their purchases. With this 
in mind, organic food is selected as popular class o f products that is conceived to be 
relatively high in ego-involvement for many Americans.
After conducting in-depth interviews, Bauer, Heinrich and Schafer (2013) 
ascertained that, for German consumers, the main reasons for buying organic food are 
that it is 1) more nutritious than non-organic food, 2) kinder to the environment, and 3) 
safer to consume because no chemicals are used in the farming process. Interestingly 
enough, the researchers also identified a fourth reason why German consumers buy 
organic food. That is, German consumers also perceive organic food as being tastier than 
non-organic food (Bauer, Heinrich and Schafer 2013). However, it is important to note 
that these cited purchasing motives fell within the first four ranks, but the order o f 
precedence differed among the interviewed consumers.
This research conducts a similar pre-test to Chang’s (2011) determination o f an 
appropriate way to systemize the different levels o f strength for green advertising claim 
in the context o f organic. That is, a pre-test is mandatory to determine the different levels 
o f perceived importance for the previously cited top three reasons why consumers buy
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organic: safer, kinder to the environment, and healthier. Once this is done, 
confirming/disconfirming evidence is manipulated effectively into appropriate levels o f 
evidence strength depending on the order o f perceived importance revealed by the pre­
test.
Evidence exposure consists o f a two (type o f evidence: confirming vs. 
disconfirming) x two (credibility: high vs. low) x two (number o f reasons: one vs. three) 








Figure 3.1 Experimental Groups
Subjects are exposed to substantial evidence which will either confirm or 
disconfirm their beliefs regarding the perceived benefits o f organic food consumption. 
Confirming evidence consists o f  pro-organic information, while disconfirming evidence 
is expected to initiate dissonance for organic consumers. The strong-condition stimuli 
contain facts from a highly credible source (i.e. Stanford University) and include
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references to all three reasons why consumers buy organic food. On the other hand, the 
weak-condition stimuli contain remarks from a much less credible source (i.e. Delta 
Community College) and include only the least significant motive for buying organic 
food. Hence, weak confirming and disconfirming evidence are ascertained pending the 
pre-test. The eight experimental stimuli or evidences are provided in Appendix A.
Three manipulation checks are in place to examine the viability o f the 
experimental manipulations. Evidence believability is measured using 6-items employed 
by Chang (2011) and original to Beltramini (1982) and MacKenzie and Lutz (1989). An 
independent samples t-test facilitates the comparison o f mean believability ratings 
between subjects in the high credibility and subjects in the low credibility experimental 
groups. A higher mean rating from subjects in high credibility conditions compared to 
that o f subjects in the low credibility conditions signifies a successful credibility 
manipulation.
For the second manipulation check, subjects are asked to choose their primary 
motive for buying organic food. In addition, subjects are asked to rate three items on a 
seven-point Likert scale: the perceived level o f importance attributed to nutrition, safety, 
and environmental friendliness in organic food consumption. A successful manipulation 
o f  evidence strength is indicated by obtaining mean responses that are comparable to 
results o f  the pre-test, and, at the very least, a similar rank order o f key motives. Lastly, a 
third manipulation check asks participants whether the randomly depicted evidence 
contained pro-organic information or, instead, challenged the notion o f organic 
superiority over conventionally-produced foods.
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Hypothesis 1 is tested by assessing subjects’ reactions to the evidence. Subjects 
are also asked if  they are persuaded by the organic evidence presented in the survey. This 
assessment also sets the stage for the ensuing qualitative assessment. Hypothesis 2 is 
tested using ANOVA to assess o f the differences between subjects' mean dissonance 
evaluations o f the strong and the weak disconfirming evidence.
Measurement Instruments
The first stage o f  research (following necessary pre-testing) assesses consumers’ 
subjective beliefs regarding organic food. Perceived health benefits, perceived safety 
benefits, and perceived environmental benefits o f organic food are measured using scales 
adapted from Bauer, Heinrich and Schafer (2013). Each o f  these perceived organic 
attribute scales contains four items measured along a 7-point, Likert-type scale. Thus, 
subjective beliefs are measured using 12 items total. Next, subjects are exposed to one o f 
the eight forms o f  organic food evidence.
The second stage o f the research investigates evidence exposure effects on 
subjects’ dissonance. The level o f conflict between beliefs and the evidence provided is 
measured with a 3-item scale developed by Gurhan-Canli and Maheswaran (1998). The 
scale was originally used to measure the congruency (or lack o f congruency) between a 
person’s brand beliefs and new information that he or she is exposed to. Thus, the 
measurement instrument is easily adapted for use in the context o f organic food.
Elliott and Devine (1994) argued that any assessment o f dissonance should 
include psychological discomfort since this is how the process o f dissonance arousal was 
originally conceptualized by Festinger (1957). Hence, the discomfort scale is proposed to 
be a reliable measure o f cognitive dissonance (Elliot and Devine 1994). Subject’s
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potential discomfort due to any conflict between their subjective beliefs and the evidence 
is measured using a 3-item scale developed by Elliot and Devine (1994). Discomfort 
measures the extent to which subjects are experiencing a state o f psychological tension 
and are troubled by it.
Product involvement is measured using a 5-item scale adapted from Beatty and 
Talpade (1994) that measures the subjects’ level interest in some specified category o f 
products. In this case, organic food will serve as the particular class o f products.
A second measurement o f  subjects’ perceived benefits o f organic food is taken to 
determine if  evidence exposure had any effect on their original beliefs. After seeing the 
evidence, subjects are asked to use three sliding scales to indicate how their beliefs about 
organic food have changed compared to their beliefs prior to exposure to the factual 
information.
The effects o f induced dissonance (and consonance) on three outcomes are 
examined following the second measurement o f subjects’ perceived beliefs regarding 
organic beliefs. Consumer perceived value is measured using a single dimension from the 
suggested 12-item short form o f the original 19 items from Sweeney and Soutar’s (2001) 
PERVAL scale (Walsh, Shiu and Hassan 2014). The scale consists o f  four value 
dimensions: quality, emotional, price, and social. Quality or functional value refers to the 
practical benefits o f using a product. Emotional or affective value refers to psychological 
feelings that consumers derive from a product. Price value refers to product worth 
compared with the sacrifices made such as cost, time, or effort spent in obtaining the 
product. Social value refers to the social utility derived from the product like self­
enhancement, prestige, and status.
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O f these four value dimensions proposed by Sweeny and Soutar (2001), quality or 
functional value is the most harmonious and fitting given the context o f this study. In 
general, consumers do not buy organic food for its price nor for its emotional or social 
purposes. Consumers typically buy organic food for its perceived functional purposes, 
such as the ones discussed previously (e.g. healthier, safer to consume, kinder to the 
environment, etc.).
Purchase intention measures the inclination o f subjects to buy or at least try 
organic food in the future. The measurement instrument consists o f  four items adapted 
from Putrevu and Lord (1994). Word-of-mouth measures subjects’ expressed likelihood 
o f  making positive comments about organic food. Positive word-of-mouth is assessed 
using a four-item scale adapted from Briiggen, Foubert, and Gremler (2011). Although 
the original items pertain to restaurant word-of-mouth, they are easily adapted for use in 
the study context o f organic foods. Finally, willingness to pay a price premium measures 
the amount subjects are willing to pay for organic food over conventional food using a 
four-item scale adapted from Netemeyer et al. (2004).
CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS AND ANALYSES
Sampling Procedure and Data Collection
Prior to the formal launch o f data collection, a pilot test was conducted to 
ascertain a rank order o f key motives for buying organic food. This was done to 
effectively manipulate the number o f reason conditions with one informational element in 
the evidence to contain the least popular one o f  the three reasons. A short survey was 
administered to 79 undergraduate students in two junior level marketing courses at 
Louisiana Tech University. As seen in Figure 4.1, a slight majority o f  respondents (52%) 
suggest that their main reason for buying organic food lies in a relative is healthiness 
rationale. For the remaining two reasons, respondents showed a very slight preference 
toward the ‘safer to consume’ aspect over ‘kinder to the environment.’
■  H ealth ier  th a n  Non-organic
■  Safer to  C onsum e
■ Kinder to  t h e  Environm ent
■  O th e r
■ N /  A (I do  n o t  buy organic.)
Figure 4.1 Reasons fo r  Buying Organic Food (Pre-test n = 79)
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Respondents who answered ‘Other’ or ‘N /A ’ were given the option o f disclosing 
additional information. Interestingly enough, one student declared that he or she believes 
that organically grown food tastes better than conventionally grown food. For most o f  the 
30% non-buyers, the primary reason for not buying organic food is high pricing. This 
finding did not come as a surprise since all o f the respondents were undergraduate 
students who may have had limited financial resources.
The final study sample consists o f survey responses from undergraduate, 
graduate, and former students at Louisiana Tech University. Formal education is 
conceived to be an influential factor in shaping peoples’ level o f knowledge and 
familiarity with organic agriculture. Thus, college students (current and former) are 
considered to be relevant to this particular study setting which revolves around the 
organic food industry. A total o f 392 observations are recorded. The estimated survey 
completion time is 10 to 15 minutes. For this reason, fifteen (15) speeder cases were 
dropped for being completed in less than four minutes as well as for 50 % or more 
missing data. An additional 36 cases were eliminated for failing to correctly respond to 
all three attention filters included in the survey. Consequently, a final total o f 341 
responses were analyzed.
The mean age o f  the subjects was 26. Nearly 62% o f the subjects were in the age 
range o f  18 to 25, and about 26% o f the subjects fell into the 26 to 35 range. The male to 
female ratio o f  the subjects was almost evenly split (49.6% male to 50.4% female). 
Roughly 60% o f the subjects were Caucasian, 19% were African American, 13% were 
Asian, and 3% were Hispanic / Latino. The remaining 5% o f subjects listed themselves as 
‘Other.’
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Subjects were randomly assigned to one o f the eight experimental conditions [two 
(evidence type: confirming vs. disconfirming) x two (credibility: high vs. low) x two 
(number o f reasons: one vs. three)]. Based on the pre-test study results, the four weaker 
evidence cells that only contain one argument were composed using environmental 
friendliness as the least important o f the three reasons for buying organic food (see 
Appendix A for Experimental Stimuli).
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Latent measurement structure o f  all relevant constructs was tested using 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in AMOS 20 (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). The 
overall CFA was conducted on the six multi-item constructs: belief disconfirmation, 
consumer dissonance, product involvement, perceived value, purchase intention, and 
word o f mouth, all measured as described in Chapter Three and as illustrated in Appendix 
B. The initial CFA measurement model contained 22 measured items with a resulting chi- 
square fit statistic o f 555.0 (p-value < 0.001) and 194 degrees o f freedom. The model 
comparative fit index (CFI) was 0.957, the root mean squared error o f approximation 
(RMSEA) was 0.074, and the parsimony normed fit index (PNF1) was 0.786.
According to Hair et al. (2010), RMSEA values less than 0.07 with a CFI o f 0.92 
or higher given the overall CFA sample size (N > 250) and number o f  variables (12 < m 
< 30) demonstrate goodness-of-fit. The initial overall measurement model, therefore, 
exhibited slightly less than adequate goodness-of-fit given the resulting RMSEA o f
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0.074. Consequently, a more comprehensive inspection o f standardized loading estimates 
and standardized covariance residuals was necessary to identify possible problematic 
issues in the measurement model.
Variables that have low loadings and high standardized residuals were eliminated 
from the initial overall CFA model. One reverse-coded variable measuring product 
involvement was dropped from the measurement model for having a low factor loading 
(>. = 0.25). Three additional variables were removed from the model for exhibiting high 
standardized covariance residuals (greater than 2.5). Each o f these suspect variables 
measured three separate constructs: product involvement, purchase intention, and positive 
word-of-mouth. The three variables correlated heavily with one another (described in 
more detail in the section on construct validity). Thus, a total o f four items were purged 
from the original model (18% reduction) resulting in a final overall CFA measurement 
model comprised o f  18 variables.
The final overall CFA measurement model demonstrated a notable improvement 
in goodness-of-fit compared to the initial CFA model fit. The final overall model 
produced a chi-square fit statistic x2 = 231.7 (p-value < 0.001) with 120 degrees o f 
freedom. The model CFI was 0.983, the RMSEA was 0.052, and the PNFI was 0.757. 
Hence, the final overall measurement model exhibited sound goodness-of-fit (Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1
Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Comparison o f  Fit fo r  Measurement Models
Overall Measurement Model x2 d f p CFI RMSEA PNFI













Final Model 231.7 120 0.000 0.983 0.052 0.757
Belief Disconfirmation 1 
(3 items)
Consumer Dissonance 1 
(3 items)
Product Involvem ent2 
(3 items)
Perceived Value 1 
(3 items)
Purchase Intention 3 
(3 items)
Positive W ord-of-Mouth 3 
(3 items)
Notes:
1 Construct items remain intact
2 Two items removed due to low factor loading and high standardized residual 
covariances
3 One item removed following residual analysis____________________________________
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Construct Validity
Goodness-of-fit alone does not substantiate an effective measurement theory. 
Construct validity refers to the extent to which a set o f measured variables actually 
reflects the theoretical latent construct that the variables are intended to measure (Hair et 
al. 2010). Therefore, the overall CFA measurement model must display adequate fit and 
must also show evidence o f construct validity.
Construct validity is comprised o f four fundamental components: convergent 
validity, discriminant validity, nomological validity, and face validity (Hair et al. 2010). 
Convergent validity implies that the variable indicators o f a particular construct should 
share a high proportion o f variance in common. Hence, average variance extracted o f 
each latent construct was calculated to assess convergence. Adequate convergence is 
supported by obtaining an average variance extracted o f  0.5 or higher (Hair et al. 2010). 
All o f the six constructs included in the overall measurement model had satisfactory 
extracted variances ranging from 0.74 to 0.90. Therefore, the variable indicators 
demonstrated sufficient convergence which in turn provided support for an accurate 
measurement theory.
Discriminant validity is the extent to which the constructs are truly distinct from 
one another (Hair et al. 2010). A rigorous test o f  discriminant validity entails comparing 
the average variance extracted for any two constructs with the squared correlation 
estimate between the two constructs. Good evidence o f discriminant validity is shown by 
obtaining extracted variances that are higher than the squared correlation estimates (Hair 
et al. 2010). Variance extracted for each o f the six constructs in the overall measurement 
model was higher than any o f the squared correlation estimates between constructs. Thus,
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each o f the six measured constructs was considered unique since the constructs show 
signs o f sound discriminant validity.
Nomological validity examines whether the correlations between constructs make 
sense according to the measurement theory (Hair et al. 2010). The construct correlations 
matrix (O) in Table 4.2 revealed that the valences o f all significant correlations were 
logical and consistent with the underlying theory. Consequently, these results provided 
evidence for nomological validity.
Table 4.2
Descriptive Statistics and Construct Correlations ( 0  Matrix)
Construct Mean SD BD CD INV PV INT WOM
1. Belief Disconfirmation 3.33 1.53 (0.89)
2. Consumer Dissonance 2.52 1.56 0.297* (0.93)
3. Product Involvement 3.63 1.67 -0.013 -0.111 (0.96)
4. Perceived Value 4.82 1.22 -0.006 -0.227* 0.753* (0.91)
5. Purchase Intention 4.18 1.64 0.012 -0.208* 0.815* 0.649* (0.95)
6. Positive Word-of- 4.57 1.56
Mouth 0.028 -0.211* 0.753* 0.762* 0.833* (0.96)
Notes: Construct reliability coefficients (a) for multi-item scales in parentheses along the 
main diagonal. N = 341
* p <  0.001
Face validity is the extent to which the content o f variables is consistent with the 
definition o f the measured construct and should be established prior to commencing tests 
o f measurement theory (Hair et al. 2010). This being said, one o f the four purchase 
intention scale items adapted from Putrevu and Lord (1994) was spotted to be more in 
accord with positive word-of-mouth during the overall CFA model assessment: ‘Suppose 
that a friend called you to get your advice in his/her grocery shopping trip. Would you 
recommend him/her to buy organic?’ Coincidentally, this item was one o f the three that
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was dropped from the initial overall CFA model following an analysis o f  standardized 























Variance 0.74 0.82 0.90 0.77 0.86 0.89




Manipulation checks were used for the type o f evidence (confirming vs. 
discontinuing), the evidence credibility (high vs. low), and the number o f arguments (one 
vs. three) experimental variables. Two separate items asked subjects to recall a) whether 
the evidence shown suggested that organic food is better than conventionally grown
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(non-organic) food, and b) which research entity reported the factual evidence on organic 
food. Confirming conditions contained evidence suggesting organic food superiority, 
while discontinuing conditions consisted o f evidence suggesting no added benefits to 
organic food consumption. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 3, Stanford University 
was cited as the source o f evidence in high credibility conditions as opposed to Delta 
Community College in the low credibility conditions. Results shown in Table 4.4 support 
the notion that the majority subjects successfully recalled the depicted evidence.
Table 4.4
Manipulation Recall
Evidence Type N Incorrect Correct % Correct
Confirming 188 38 150 79.8
Disconfirming 153 45 108 70.6
High Credibility 173 13 160 92.5
Low Credibility 168 32 136 81.0
Evidence believability was measured using six-items on seven-point Likert scale 
that asked subjects how much they agree or disagree with evaluative terms regarding the 
content o f the evidence such as ‘credible’, ‘believable’, and trustworthy.’ This scale 
assessment was not included in the CFA since it was not part o f the model theorized. A 
composite reliability analysis conducted on the six scale items measuring evidence 
believability produced a Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (a) o f  0.92. Thus, the evidence 
believability scale was considered to have very good reliability (Zikmund and Babin 
2010 ).
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An independent samples t-test was used to assess the mean differences in 
perceived evidence believability between subjects in the high and low credibility groups 
(Table 4.5). The difference in means yielded an insignificant Levene’s test for equality o f 
variances (F = 0.005, p = 0.942). Subjects in the high credibility groups revealed a mean 
believability rating o f 5.2 compared to a mean rating o f 4.9 by subjects in the low 
credibility groups (t = -2.61, d f = 339, p = 0.01). Thus, statistically speaking, the results 
were consistent with an effective manipulation o f evidence credibility. Practically 
speaking, however, the effect size was small for the manipulation given that each o f  the 
obtained means rounded to 5. Perhaps the reason for this finding is that the evidence itself 
was not very surprising for most subjects. Consequently, the source o f  evidence may not 
have really mattered.
Table 4.5
Means and Standard Deviations o f  Evidence Believability
Credibility N Mean SD SE
High 173 5.20 1.04 0.08
Low 168 4.90 1.08 0.08
A subsequent investigation o f the key motives for buying organic food was 
conducted to substantiate the rank order obtained from the pilot study. Bauer, Heinrich 
and Schafer’s (2013) 12-item scale was employed for assessing beliefs regarding 
perceived organic benefits (a = 0.93). As depicted in Table 4.6, health benefits had the 
highest mean rating (5.13) followed by environmental (4.95) and safety benefits (4.79). 
These results conflicted slightly with the rank order obtained in the pilot study.
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Therefore, further inspection was warranted. (Note: Females reported slightly higher 
means compared to males for each o f the three perceived benefits.)
Table 4.6
Mean Ratings for Perceived Organic Benefits
Motives Overall Mean (SD) Males Females
Health 5.14(1.24) 5.07(1.23) 5.20(1.25)
Safety 4.79(1.34) 4.72(1.31) 4.86(1.38)
Environmental 4.95 (1.25) 4 .80(1.26) 5.10(1.23)
The same query from the pilot study which asked respondents to select their 
primary reason for buying organic food was also administered to the final study sample. 
As illustrated in Figure 4.2, a sizable 43% o f the subjects listed ‘healthier’ as their 
number one reason for buying organic food. Furthermore, a much higher percentage o f 
subjects chose ‘safer to consume’ as a principle motive (17%) compared to the 
percentage o f  subjects who selected ‘kinder to the environment’ (5%). Thus, the notion 
that eco-friendliness is the least important o f the three main cited reasons for buying 
organic food was reasonably supported, and the factual evidence conditions containing 
this category only conceivably provided the weakest arguments.
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■  H ealth ier  th a n  N on-organic
■  Safer to  C onsum e
■ Kinder to  th e  E nvironm ent
■  O th e r
■  N /  A (I d o  no t  buy organic.)
Figure 4.2 Reasons fo r  Buying Organic Food (Final Sample N  = 341)
Hypothesis 1
Prior to testing the prediction in Hypothesis 1 that disconfirming evidence 
exposure results in more cases o f belief perseverance than belief change, the 45 subjects 
who did not correctly recall that the disconfirming organic evidence proclaims that 
organic food is not better than non-organic food were removed from the subsequent 
analysis. Furthermore, based on the obtained qualitative responses, an additional 35 
subjects were eliminated for having preconceived negative views o f  organic food and / or 
the organic industry. That is, these subjects viewed the disconfirming evidence regarding 
organic food as ‘confirm ing’ their existing beliefs. For example, one o f the subjects 
expressed: “I never really thought organic farming was much better for you or for the 
environment and these facts confirm that.” Another one o f  these skeptical subjects in 
doubt states that “organic food is overrated and misleads the public to believe it is 
healthier.”
Consequently, o f  the 153 total subjects in the disconfirming evidence groups, only 
73 subjects provided suitable data for assessing Hypothesis 1. Subjects were asked if  they
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were persuaded by the disconfirming organic evidence presented in the survey. Forty 
subjects yielded to the factual evidence provided and changed their beliefs, while the 
remaining 33 subjects retained their existing pro-organic beliefs and succumbed to belief 
perseverance. Thus, the prediction offered in Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Nevertheless, 
the qualitative responses o f these 33 subjects provided a solid sample for evaluating the 
premise o f  belief perseverance.
This initial assessment indicated that some subjects had their beliefs confirmed 
with ‘disconfirming’ evidence types, while others had their beliefs disconfirmed with 
‘confirm ing’ pro-organic evidence. Thus, from this point on for the sake o f  clarification 
due to this finding, ‘disconfirming’ evidence will be referred to as ‘factual’ or ‘research- 
based’ evidence, and ‘confirming’ evidence will be referred to as ‘m yth’ or ‘fictitious’ 
evidence. The ANOVA and SEM models analyses included the entire sample size since 
dissonant feelings may arise for either evidence type. The experimental results are 
discussed first, followed by the SEM results and qualitative assessment.
Experimental Results
Table 4.7 displays descriptive statistics. A multivariate analysis o f variance 
(MANOVA) assessment using all respondents was necessary prior to testing the 
relationships predicted in Hypothesis 2. This model used all experimental variables to 
predict each composite dependent variable (belief disconfirmation, consumer dissonance, 
perceived value, purchase intention, and positive word o f  mouth) within a full-factorial 
design. The results suggested significant multivariate F (based on W ilks’ Lambda) 
statistics for Evidence Type [F(5, 329) = 5.23, p < 0.001] and the Credibility x Number 
o f Reasons interaction [F(5, 329) = 2.34, p < 0.05], The results also suggested slightly
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significant results (at the 0.10 level) for the Number o f Reasons variable [F(5, 329) = 
1.98, p = 0.08] as well as for the Evidence Type x Number o f Reasons interaction [F(5, 
329) -  2.14, p = 0.06]. Insignificant multivariate F statistics were found for Credibility 
[F(5, 329) = 1.13, p = 0.34], the Evidence Type x Credibility interaction [F(5, 329) = 
0.91, p = 0.47], and the three-way interaction [F(5, 329) = 0.19, p = 0.97]. The ensuing 
results are a reflection o f the univariate, full-factorial ANOVA model analyses which 
include all main effects and interactions as predictors.
Table 4.7













Myth 3.19(1.45) 2.20(1 .46) 4.97(1 .22) 4 .48(1 .59) 4.84(1 .50)
Factual 3.50(1.61) 2.90(1.61) 4.64(1 .21) 3.82 (1.62) 4.25 (1.58)
Credibility
Low 3.46(1.58) 2.62(1 .60) 4.74(1 .26) 4.04 (1.64) 4.49(1 .61)
High 3.20(1.48) 2.41 (1.52) 4.90(1 .19) 4.32 (1.62) 4.65 (1.52)
Number o f  Reasons 
One 3.40(1.56) 2.38 (1.47) 4.83 (1.25) 4 .06(1 .57) 4.57(1 .59)
Three 3.26(1.51) 2.64(1.64) 4.81 (1.20) 4 .29(1 .69) 4.57(1 .54)
Overall Mean 3.33 (1.53) 2.52 (1.56) 4.82 (1.23) 4 .18(1 .64) 4.57(1 .56)
Two separate full-factorial ANOVA models were used to test the predicted 
relationships in Hypothesis 2 between evidence strength and the dependent variables o f 
interest, belief disconfirmation and consumer dissonance. The first predicted belief
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disconfirmation (incongruence between beliefs and information), and the second 
predicted consumer dissonance (psychological discomfort). The first univariate model F 
statistic was insignificant [F(7, 340) = 1.47, p = 0.18]. The second model F statistic was 
significant [F (7, 340) = 3.22, p < 0.01)]. As a result, further analysis focused on 
examining the main effects on consumer dissonance.
A significant evidence type main effect on consumer dissonance was found (F = 
16.58, p < 0.001). Subjects reacted to factual evidence with a mean dissonance rating o f 
2.90 compared to 2.20 for fictitious evidence. These results were consistent with the 
general hypothesis that the factual, researched-based evidence leads to more feelings o f 
dissonance than the mythical, pro-organic evidence. However, the results revealed 
insignificant main effects o f credibility and number o f  reasons on consumer dissonance 
(F = 0.73, p = 0.40 and F = 2.20, p = 0.14, respectively). In addition, the Credibility x 
Number o f  Reasons interaction effect on dissonance was insignificant (F = 1.33, 
p = 0.25). The other pair o f two-way interactions and the three-way interaction were also 
found to be insignificant. Thus, the predictions in Hypothesis 2 were not supported since 
neither o f the two strength factors (credibility nor the number o f reasons) had an effect on 









Low Credibility High Credibility
One Reason Three Reasons
Figure 4.3 Strength Interaction Effect (Lack of) on Consumer Dissonance
The estimated marginal means are reported. Subjects reacted to low credibility 
evidence with a mean dissonance rating o f  2.61 compared to 2.47 for high credibility 
evidence. Moreover, subjects revealed a mean dissonance rating o f 2.42 for evidence 
containing one o f  the reasons for buying organic food compared to 2.66 for subjects 
exposed to evidence with all three reasons. These results, if  significant, would only 
partially support Hypothesis 2 since strong evidence is defined as having high credibility 
and containing three motivational reasons.
The structural modeling approach employed followed the two-step analytical 
procedure (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Although, in this case, a second measurement 
model was developed to examine only the constructs o f interest necessary for structural 
equation modeling. That is, product involvement was left out o f the subsequent CFA 
model given that the test o f moderation is conducted via hierarchical multiple linear
Structural Model Testing
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regression. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was employed to test the remaining 
hypothesized theoretical model relationships shown in Figure 2.2.
The second CFA model was run on the five multi-item constructs once product 
involvement was removed from the overall measurement model (Table 4.8). The 
resulting measurement model displayed satisfactory fit statistics: x  = 163.6, p < 0.001,
d f = 80, CFI = 0.983, RMSEA = 0.055, and PNFI = 0.737.
Table 4.8
Structural Path Coefficients fo r  Theoretical Model
Theoretical Model
Hypotheses/paths P t P
H3:
BD —► CD 0.295 5.053 ***
H5:
C D —> PV -0.238 -4.139 ***
H6a:
PV —► INT 0.719 13.816 ***
H6b:
PV -► WOM 0.813 16.667 ***
Added Path:








X2 df RMSEA CFI PNFI
313.1 86 0.088 0.954 0.769
The resulting chi-square fit statistic from testing the structural model is 313.1 
(p <  0.001) with 86 degrees o f  freedom. The model CFI was 0.954, the RMSEA was
0.088, and the PNFI was 0.769. The obtained RMSEA was above the recommended cut­
75
off rule o f thumb o f 0.07. Furthermore, the chi-square difference between the 
measurement model and structural model was significant (Ax2 -  149.5, Adf = 6), which 
suggested inadequate structural fit to the specified theory (Hair et al. 2010). A more 
detailed explanation for why this occurred is included in post hoc analyses along with a 
revised theoretical model.
Despite the lacking fit, model hypotheses were tested by examining standardized 
path estimates. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, a positive relationship existed between 
belief disconfirmation and consumer dissonance (P = 0.295, t = 5.053, p < 0.001). In 
support o f Hypothesis 5, structural model results depicted a negative relationship between 
consumer dissonance and perceived value (P = -0.238, t = -4.139, p < 0.001). As 
predicted by Hypothesis 6a and 6b, a positive relationship existed between perceived 
value and purchase intention (P = 0.719, t = 13.816, p < 0.001), as well as between 
perceived value and positive word o f mouth (P = 0.813, t = 16.667, p < 0.001).
Moderation Test
A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to test the 
hypothesis whether product involvement moderates the relationship between belief 
disconfirmation and consumer dissonance. In the first regression model, belief 
disconfirmation and product involvement, the two ‘independent variables,’ were included 
to predict consumer dissonance, the ‘dependent variable.’ Belief disconfirmation and 
product involvement accounted for a significant amount o f variance in consumer 






















In the second regression model, the interaction between belief disconfirmation 
and product involvement was added to the analysis. This interaction term failed to 
account for a significant proportion o f the variance in consumer dissonance: AR2 = .004, 
AF (1, 337) = 1.52, and p = 0.219. Thus, the moderating effect o f product involvement on 
the relationship between belief disconfirmation and consumer dissonance predicted by 
Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
Qualitative Assessment
Ryan and Bernard (2003) provide an excellent guide for analyzing text responses. 
The researchers suggest that analyzing text involves four tasks: 1) discovering themes 
and subthemes, 2) winnowing themes to a manageable few by keeping the ones that are 
more pertinent, 3) building hierarchies o f themes, and 4) linking themes into theoretical 
models. The primary goal o f  the qualitative portion o f  this dissertation was to discover 
themes o f  belief perseverance, and Ryan and Bernard (2003) offer several techniques for 
conducting this main task (e.g. repetitions, metaphors and analogies, transitions, missing 
data etc.).
The researchers’ decision tree seen in Figure 4.5 was utilized, and the repetitions 
technique was selected to facilitate the unearthing o f recurring themes. Repetition is cited 
as one o f the simplest techniques to identify themes. Occurring and reoccurring concepts 
were noted and connected to the subjects’ verbatim expressions. Given the manageable 
sample o f belief preserving subjects, this operation was performed manually without the 
use o f  text analysis software. Concepts that appeared frequently in the qualitative 
responses were presumably more likely to be themes o f a particular a phenomenon (Ryan 




















































Potential themes for belief perseverance were explored by assessing qualitative
responses o f  the 33 subjects discussed during the testing o f Hypothesis 1. Below is a
succinct selection o f subjects’ responses containing explanations for belief perseverance
(explicit and implicit):
1. I will not be tricked or lied to about foods my fam ily  consumes. Public 
information this day in age needs to be questioned, and I  do not believe 
everything I  am told.
2. I  don't know the scope o f  the research and the limitations o f  it methodologies. I  
clearly see the difference when I  consume, it's not psychological, it's real.
3. I  do not fin d  the evidence presented in this survey the least bit compelling. I f  
anyone is convinced by a couple o f  paragraphs, they probably change their minds 
quite often.
4. There is ju s t as much research to the contrary. A ten to twenty year, in depth, 
non-partisan study o f  a wide sampling o f  people who did and did not consume 
organic foods would change my stance one way or another.
5. Even i f  it is not healthier and has no better impact on the environment, from  
experience I  know that organic dairy products last longer; therefore, I  will 
continue buying organic dairy because it allows me to waste less which in turn is 
more cost effective and produces less waste (better fo r  the environment).
6. I  think I am not convinced because it goes against everything that I thought I 
knew. I  think time and more research would change my stance.
7. I  believe including some current statistics and figures (from a few  creditable 
sources) about the overall yields o f  crops using both traditional and organic 
growing methods, might be a good way to compel more people to consider the 
points being made in the presented information. Nothing speaks stronger than 
stats from a 'well-known and established source.'
8. Links to research papers with factual evidence would help me believe more as I  
am naturally skeptic o f  things. I  prefer prim ary research and fac ts instead o f  
summarized secondary sources.
9. I  still think that ultimately organic fo o d  is safer and better fo r  the environment 
because it does not require extensive factory processing or chemical inductions 
that processed foods undergo. Factory function in itse lf is harmful to the 
environment due to the use o f  natural resources to maintain function and release
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o f  harsh chemicals into the atmosphere. Organic foods are subject to 
contamination but not to the magnitude that processed foods are.
10. I  view this type o f  research with skepticism. I  would need answers: Who funded  
the research? What was the extent o f  the research? What type o f  sampling? What 
was the time period and length o f  the research? I  strongly believe that less 
chemicals/pesticides used in the production o f  foods is healthier.
Five recurring themes emerged following a careful examination o f the full sample 
o f text responses. The themes were categorized by the type o f reasoning revealed 
(explicit and implicit) for why the subjects did not modify their beliefs. These five types 
were classified as Discrediters, Debaters, Skeptics, Upholders, and Fencers. Discrediters 
downplayed the significance o f information shown to them and did this in a number o f 
ways. For instance, several subjects stated that the evidence study was incomprehensive 
and not thorough or detailed enough. Some questioned the scope o f  the research and its 
methods and limitations, while others suggested that more testing was needed to validate 
the evidence (even though the evidence given was obtained from a meta-analysis o f 
hundreds o f studies).
Debaters argued the notion o f opposing research. That is, a number o f  subjects 
cited the fact that pro-organic information also exists (e.g. “There is just as much research 
to the contrary).” Skeptics had their doubts and suspicion or distrust o f  any shared 
information in general. A prime example is seen in the first text response, e.g. “ I do not 
believe everything I’m told.” Upholders were keen to make mention o f additional 
perceived attributes that were not already debunked. For example, some subjects claimed 
that organic food lasts longer or tastes better. Others remarked on the perceived long term 
benefits and safeguards o f organic food consumption and offered in depth rationale for 
their viewpoints (as seen in the fifth response listed). Lastly, Fencers alluded to the
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concept o f  time in their explanations and were essentially slow adopters. These people 
were on the cusp o f belief modification ( ‘on the fence’) yet hesitant o f such a sudden 
change o f  thought.
The five themes o f belief perseverance discussed are not purported to be all- 
inclusive. Moreover, a person characterized by belief perseverance may exhibit aspects 
from more than one category, as is the case in this particular study. For instance, as seen 
in the sixth text response, this subject displayed characteristics o f being a Discrediter 
(calling for “more research”) and being a Fencer (“more time ... would change my 
stance”). Likewise, the pair o f subjects who reported responses eight and 10 both showed 
signs o f being Discrediters (e.g. “ I prefer primary research and facts instead o f 
summarized secondary sources”) and Skeptics (e.g. “I am naturally skeptic o f things,” 
and “I view this type o f research with skepticism.”) The implications o f these qualitative 
findings (and all findings in this chapter) are discussed in Chapter Five.
Post Hoc Analyses
Post hoc analyses were conducted to investigate 1) the inadequate fit obtained for 
the hypothesized theoretical model, and 2) the main (and interaction) effects on the 
marketing-related outcomes, i.e. perceived value, purchase intention, and positive word 
o f  mouth.
Firstly, examination o f the standardized covariance residuals in the hypothesized 
structural model revealed very high values (greater than 4) surrounding variables for 
purchase intention and positive word o f  mouth. This finding suggested high collinearity 
between the two constructs. As seen in Table 4.2, purchase intention and positive word o f
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mouth had a shared covariance o f  O = 0.833 (p < 0.001). Naturally, these two outcomes 
are highly correlated, and both sets o f  variables could have perhaps loaded onto one 
composite, unidimensional construct.
The decision was made to remove a constraint by estimating a path from purchase 
intention to positive word-of-mouth. The reasoning was that consumers are not likely to 
engage in positive word-of-mouth until and unless they are willing to purchase a product 
themselves. A new, revised theoretical model was tested once this solo change o f an 
added path estimate is implemented.
The revised theoretical model demonstrated significantly improved fit statistics: 
X2 = 168.1, p < 0.001, d f = 85, CFI = 0.983, RMSEA = 0.054, and PNFI = 0.783. 
Accordingly, the chi-square difference between the measurement model and the revised 
structural model was insignificant (Ax2 = 4.5, Adf = 5), which provided substantial 
supporting evidence for the revised theoretical model (Hair et al. 2010). Consequently, 
the standardized path estimates in the revised structural model were examined to ensure 
that all o f the hypothesized relationships were still supported.
In validation o f Hypothesis 3, a positive relationship existed between belief 
disconfirmation and consumer dissonance (P = 0.295, t = 5.055, p < 0.001). Consistent 
with Hypothesis 5, revised model results depicted a negative relationship between 
consumer dissonance and perceived value (P = -0.232, t = -4.024, p < 0.001). In accord 
with Hypothesis 6a and 6b, a positive relationship was exhibited between perceived value 
and purchase intention (P = 0.651, t = 12.618, p < 0.001), as well as between perceived 




Structural Path Coefficients fo r  Revised Model
Revised Model
Hypotheses/paths P t P
H3:
BD —*• CD 0.295 5.055 ***
H5:
CD —* PV -0.232 -4.024 ***
H6a:
PV —* INT 0.651 12.618 "ki ck
H6b:
PV -► WOM 0.384 8.544 k k k
Added Path:








X2 df RMSEA CFI PNFI
168.1 85 0.054 0.983 0.783
Not surprisingly, the removed constraint which estimated a structural path from 
purchase intention to positive word o f mouth also revealed a significant, positive 
relationship (P = 0.582, t = 13.269, p < 0.001).
Regarding the second portion o f the post hoc analyses, Table 4.10 displays 
ANOVA results showing the effects o f the experimental predictors on three dependent 
variable outcomes: perceived value, purchase intention, and positive word o f mouth. 
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Three separate full-factorial ANOVA models were used to test the relationships 
between the predictors and the three marketing outcomes. All three univariate F statistics 
were significant for the models predicting perceived value [F(7, 340) = 2.17, p < 0.05], 
purchase intention [F(7, 340) = 3.59, p = 0.001], and positive word o f  mouth [F(7, 340) = 
4.61, p <  0.001],
As portrayed in Table 4.10, significant evidence type main effects on all three 
outcome variables were found. Subjects exposed to factual evidence revealed a mean 
perceived value rating o f  4.64 compared to 4.97 for those shown pro-organic, mythical 
evidence. The same phenomenon o f higher mean outcome ratings resulting from pro- 
organic information exposure was observed for purchase intention (Xmy[fl -  4.48 vs.
xfactual = 3 82> and P°sitive WOrd o f  m0Uth ( Xmyth = 4 84 VS‘ Xfactual = 4-25).
A marginally significant two-way interaction o f Evidence Type x Number o f 
Reasons was found to influence perceived value (F = 3.28, p = 0.07), while this same 
interaction significantly affected positive word o f mouth (F = 6.96, p = 0.01). These 
interactions are displayed in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. Although all subjects reported similar 
mean perceived values for evidence containing one motivational reason for buying 
organic food (Xmyth_one = 4.86, Xfactual- one = 4.80), subjects shown three motivational 
reasons indicated higher perceived value in mythical, pro-organic conditions compared to 
those in factual evidence conditions {Xmyth_three = 5.08, Xfactual_three = 4.54).
Moreover, similar means for positive word o f mouth were reported across one-reason 
conditions (xmyth-one = 4.63, Xfactual_one = 4.53), but not in the three-reason





































One Reason Three Reasons
Figure 4.7 Evidence Type x  Number o f  Reasons on Perceived Value
The Credibility x Number o f  Reasons interaction significantly affected positive 
word o f mouth (F = 6.69, p = 0.01) and, to a lesser extent, purchase intention at the 0.10 
level (F = 3.28, p = 0.07). These interaction effects on purchase intention and positive 
word o f mouth are depicted in Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10, respectively. All subjects 
reported similar buying intentions for evidence containing one motivational reason for 
buying organic food, regardless o f credibility (y Jotv_one = 4.08, Xhigh_one = 4.01). 
However, subjects shown three motivational reasons indicated higher intentions to buy in 
high credibility conditions compared to those in low credibility conditions ( X [ o w - t h r e e  =  
3-98, X h ig h ~ t h r e e  = 4.55). Furthermore, slight mean differences for positive word o f 
mouth were noted across one-reason conditions (y . = 4.74, y. • . = 4.42),low —one  ’  ^  n ig h —one n
whereas larger mean differences were obtained from three-reason conditions (Xlow^ three



















































Low Credibility High Credibility
—  One Reason • • • • • •  Three Reasons
Figure 4.10 Credibility x  Number o f  Reasons on Positive WOM
Given the statistically significant yet small effect size resulting from the 
credibility manipulation, i.e. mean ratings o f  5.2 and 4.9 for the high and low credibility 
conditions, respectively, a more thorough investigation o f this effect was warranted. A 
full-factorial multivariate model was run using evidence believability as a covariate. The 
resulting MANCOVA model was not significant [F(8, 340) = 1.54, p = 0.14). 
Consequently, the covariate was removed to check the significance o f  the MANOVA 
model. Results from the MANOVA model, however, were still insignificant [F(7, 340) = 
1.47, p = 0.18]. Thus, for all practical purposes, the credibility manipulation was not very 
substantial and adequate at best.
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Summary o f Findings
The following is a brief synopsis o f key findings from the overall results and 
analyses:
Finding 1: No support was found for Hypothesis 1 which predicts that factual 
evidence exposure will result in more instances o f belief perseverance than 
belief change. The subjects who modified their beliefs outnumbered those 
who persisted with their existing beliefs.
Finding 2: A significant evidence type main effect on consumer dissonance was 
found, wherein subjects exhibit higher mean dissonance ratings for factual 
evidence compared to mythical, pro-organic evidence.
Finding 3: The prediction offered in Hypothesis 2 was not supported since the 
main effects o f credibility and number o f reasons (and interaction effect) 
on consumer dissonance were insignificant.
Finding 4: Significant evidence type main effects on perceived value, purchase 
intention, and word o f mouth were found.
Finding 5: Statistical support was found for a two-way interaction o f  Evidence 
Type x Number o f Reasons on perceived value and positive word o f 
mouth.
Finding 6: Statistical support was found for a two-way interaction o f Credibility x 
Number o f Reasons on purchase intention and positive word o f  mouth.
Finding 7: A revised theoretical model provided support for Hypothesis 3, i.e. the 
predicted positive relationship between belief disconfirmation and 
consumer dissonance.
Finding 8: No support was found for Hypothesis 4 which predicts the moderating 
effect o f product involvement on the relationship between belief 
disconfirmation and consumer dissonance.
Finding 9: Hypothesis 5 was supported since a negative relationship was found 
between consumer dissonance and perceived value.
Finding 10: Positive relationships were found between perceived value and both 
purchase intention and positive word-of-mouth, supporting Hypothesis 6a 
and 6b, respectively.
Finding 11: Five themes o f  belief perseverance (types o f people) were identified: 
Discrediters, Debaters, Skeptics, Upholders, and Fencers.
CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS, LIMITATIONS,
AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This dissertation investigates the effects o f belief disconfirmation on consum ers’ 
psychological thoughts and the subsequent effect o f this mental conflict on behavioral 
intentions. The primary objective is to address three research questions regarding 
cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias and belief perseverance. A mixed-method 
research sequence was designed specifically to examine these research questions. The 
discussion o f  findings is organized based on its relation to the research inquiries. 
Theoretical contributions and managerial implications are presented next. Lastly, the 
dissertation concludes with study limitations and suggestions for future research.
RQ 1: Can disconfirming evidence exposure induce considerable dissonance? I f  
so, how does varying the strength o f  disconfirming factual evidence affect 
consumer beliefs?
From the experimental results, people exposed to factual evidence demonstrated 
higher levels o f  cognitive dissonance compared to people given pro-organic, mythical 
evidence. However, the strength o f evidence was not shown to be a substantial factor for 
this particular relationship. That is, neither the main effects o f evidence credibility and 
number o f reasons nor the related interaction effect appeared to have a discernible
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influence on consumer dissonance. Consequently, factual, research-based evidence could 
conceivably induce sufficient dissonance to influence people’s existing beliefs even if 
such evidence is not very substantial.
More people than expected had their beliefs endorsed with ‘disconfirm ing’ 
evidence types, whereas others (to a lesser extent) had their beliefs disapproved with 
‘confirm ing’ pro-organic evidence. This outcome o f perceiving differently the two types 
o f evidence may seem surprising. One can only speculate on possible explanations. In 
particular, observe that the study sample consists o f college students (alumni and 
current). Higher education is expected to broaden perspectives, and educated people tend 
to be more knowledgeable about various subject matters, including seemingly popular, 
contemporary topics such as the organic industry. This notion o f higher awareness and 
knowledge offers some rationale as to why so many subjects in the ‘disconfirm ing’ 
evidence type conditions were not surprised by the facts and, also, to why some subjects 
in the ‘confirm ing’ evidence type conditions expressed their doubts regarding the pro- 
organic content. That being said, the results offer a number o f notable implications.
It is intriguing that the strength o f evidence (credibility and number o f reasons 
shown) did not prove to be a significant factor in influencing people to modify their 
beliefs. More specifically, the factual evidence given to all four cells in the research- 
based conditions was successful in changing beliefs regarding the perceived benefits o f 
organic food. Thus, for many people, the content o f  the evidence, regardless o f the 
credibility or the extent o f that message, was sufficient in swaying their sentiments. This 
finding is consistent with previous research, e.g., Anderson, Lepper and Ross (1980), in
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the debriefing paradigm which documents the changing o f beliefs in the presence o f 
weak, fictitious “evidence.”
RQ2: What are the effects o f  dissonance resulting from  belie f disconfirmation on 
purchase-related outcomes '?
The revised structural model provided solid support for the hypothesized model 
relationships. A negative relationship was found between consumer dissonance and 
perceived value, and, not surprisingly, positive relationships existed between perceive 
value and both purchase intention and positive word o f mouth. These findings indicated 
that consumers can experience dissonance due to belief disconfirmations, and this 
dissonance can negatively affect 1) the perceived value o f a product, 2) subsequent 
intentions to buy, and 3) word o f mouth. In other words, the dissonance evoked from 
disconfirming information was a detriment to peoples’ perceived value o f  a product and 
subsequent purchase-related behavior. Thus, the premise o f  this entire dissertation was 
validated accordingly.
Product involvement did not moderate the relationship between belief 
disconfirmation and consumer dissonance. Moreover, product involvement and 
dissonance revealed a marginally significant negative shared correlation. These findings 
appear to conflict with some previous research which suggests that messages o f high 
involvement have greater personal relevance and, thus, tend to result in greater 
consequences than messages o f  low involvement (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo 1979; Petty, 
Cacioppo and Schumann 1983). Not surprisingly, the study sample comprised o f college 
students displayed a relatively low level o f product involvement on average which may 
explain why the case for moderation is not supported. Roughly 30% o f the sample
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consists o f non-buyers, the majority o f which stating high prices o f organic food as the 
primary reason. However, the marginally significant, negative relationship between 
product involvement and dissonance was a bit unusual. Why would people who are less 
involved with organic food experience more dissonance (any at all) as a result o f seeing 
disconfirming information? Perhaps highly involved people may be more adept to using 
various dissonance coping techniques. This phenomenon is argued further in the 
discussion o f RQ3.
The main effects o f evidence type on each o f the three outcomes (perceived value, 
purchase intention, and positive word o f mouth) were also ascertained in post hoc 
analyses. Yet, much like dissonance, these outcomes remained unresponsive to the main 
effects o f credibility and number o f reasons. However, a pair o f  two-way interaction 
effects o f 1) Evidence Type x Number o f  Reasons and 2) Credibility x Number of 
Reasons were found on perceived value and positive word mouth and on purchase 
intention and positive word o f mouth, respectively. Hence, the effects o f number o f 
reasons on perceived value and positive word o f mouth depended on the type o f 
evidence; while the effects o f  number o f reasons on purchase intention and word o f 
mouth depended on credibility
What could be implied by these interactions? The nature o f  the first two-way 
interaction implies that consumers had stronger (less positive) perceived value and word 
o f mouth reactions to factual information when such information contained three 
arguments compared to one. Similarly, the second two-way interaction suggested that 
consumers exhibited higher intentions to buy and greater likelihood to engage in positive
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word o f mouth when exposed to high credibility evidence that contained three arguments 
compared to one (perhaps due to receiving stronger confirmations).
RQ3: Why do consumers continue to hold onto their beliefs even though they are 
exposed to robust, disconfirming evidence that suggests a belie f change is 
warranted?
As mentioned previously, Festinger (1957, 1964) points out three ways that 
people cope with dissonance: 1) by changing their beliefs, 2) by obtaining new 
information to support their existing beliefs, and 3) by reducing the importance o f the 
dissonant factors or by disregarding it altogether. Many people who experience 
dissonance mitigated the cognitive conflict by modifying their existing beliefs. 
Nonetheless, a number o f  others were more defiant, succumbing to belief perseverance 
and revealing different routes to alleviate their feelings o f  dissonance. From the 
qualitative assessment, five themes o f belief perseverance (types o f  people) were 
identified: Discrediters, Debaters, Skeptics, Upholders, and Fencers.
Some interesting parallels can be made between Festinger’s (1957, 1964) 
dissonance coping mechanisms and the five themes o f belief perseverance that emerged 
from the qualitative assessment. Debaters (who referred to contrary research) and 
Upholders (who cited attributes that were not originally mentioned) are argued to use a 
particular form o f the second dissonance coping technique. Specifically, these people 
attempted to reinforce their existing beliefs with additional confirmations so that their 
total level o f consonance outweighs the new, unsettling dissonant thoughts. Discrediters 
(who tried to belittle the significance o f disconfirming information) and Skeptics (who 
were suspicious o f any shared information to begin with) are clearly taking the third route
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to resolving dissonance. That is, Discrediters were essentially reducing the importance o f 
dissonant factors by criticizing or invalidating the disconfirming information in various 
ways. On the other hand, Skeptics, due to their general sense o f suspicion and distrust for 
any shared information, found it easier to ignore the disconfirming information all 
together by calling it hoax. Skeptics perceived themselves as taking the high road and 
saving themselves from being deceived when, in reality, they were only deceiving 
themselves from learning something new that opposes their existing beliefs. Why? The 
results from this research clearly show that consonance is the status quo, and remaining 
in the status quo could make life less complicated. People who modified their beliefs as a 
result o f considering the disconfirming evidence clearly fall into Festinger’s first method 
o f dissonance coping. Fencers (who showed signs o f belief modification but are a bit 
hesitant) were likely to take the first route to dissonance resolution and change their 
beliefs with additional persuasion.
Theoretical Contributions
The study examines possible links between the pervasive psychological 
phenomena o f confirmation bias and belief perseverance to Festinger’s (1957) theory o f 
cognitive dissonance. Consumer research on cognitive dissonance has limited the scope 
o f  this extensive theory by narrowly focusing on occurrences o f dissonance after a 
consumer has made a decision or a purchase. Although previous research on post­
purchase dissonance (or buyer’s remorse) provides important theoretical and practical 
implications, this dissertation demonstrates that dissonance may arise in numerous other 
ways outside decision making.
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Among the main goals o f this study is to show that dissonance could arise prior to 
a purchase because o f  belief disconfirming evidence regarding perceived product 
benefits. The results reveal that dissonance can be evoked by presenting people with 
disconfirming evidence about the perceived benefits o f  buying and consuming organic 
foods. An empirical test o f dissonance provocation stemming from perceived belief 
disconfirmations connotes the negative effects o f dissonance on marketing-related 
outcomes. Therefore, this research offers an alternative approach to testing cognitive 
dissonance theory.
An examination o f the extant literature exposes a lack o f  existing scales for 
measuring a person’s proclivity to belief perseverance. In addition to displaying a strong 
connection between dissonance theory and belief perseverance, the qualitative assessment 
o f why consumer beliefs persevere (along with the five emerging themes) provides a 
solid foundation for a scale development on belief perseverance. Future research 
employing such a scale could serve as a valuable tool for consumer researchers to 
identify and examine obstinate consumers.
Managerial Implications
Academic research on cognitive dissonance would only benefit marketing 
practitioners if  it provides guidance as to what can and should be done about a custom er’s 
dissonance (Hunt 1970). Marketing managers are cognizant that being able to 
successfully reduce dissonance levels o f  their patrons provides a vital competitive 
advantage. In this study, the common link shown between cognitive dissonance and 
belief perseverance has shed light on the question o f why custom ers’ erroneous beliefs
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can persist despite exposure to substantial disconfirming evidence, and this offers 
important implications for marketing strategy.
Generally speaking, it can be argued that consumers tend to adopt inaccurate 
information when such information promotes a potentially ingratiating self-concept. 
Given that organic food consumption is usually considered prosocial, and therefore 
potentially ingratiating, consumers may aspire to be perceived as folks who consume 
organic food. As such, consumers with a positive orientation toward organic food 
promotion, in particular, may make themselves vulnerable to accepting superficial (or 
even inaccurate) information if  such information promotes their self-image. Although this 
effect is not found to be exacerbated in instances o f high product involvement, this study 
still has important implications for policy makers and marketers in their quest to educate 
consumers and influence their behaviors. Moreover, the qualitative assessment o f belief 
perseverance is a step forward for more constructive communication between policy 
makers, marketers, and customers about how to mitigate the enactment o f  incorrect 
beliefs.
Consider-the-opposite strategy (Ross, Lepper and Hubbard 1975; Anderson 1982; 
Lord, Lepper and Preston 1984) may be the only available technique capable to 
successfully remedy the confirmation bias and instances o f belief perseverance. The 
technique simply involves encouraging consumers to reflect on reasons that their 
subjective beliefs might be incorrect and why the opposing view may instead be true. 
This study explored open-ended statements to reveal why beliefs persist in the face o f 
disconfirming evidence. The subsequent five emerging themes (or types o f consumers) 
infer additional corrective strategies for overcoming belief perseverance. In other words,
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the five emerging themes o f belief perseverance can potentially offer some guidance to 
managers on how to persuade consumers to interrogate their beliefs and rebuff their 
incorrect preconceived notion about certain products or product attributes. Moreover, 
managers may also gain insight for effectively disseminating product information and 
strengthening arguments against misguided consumption. For example, a corrective 
strategy for Debaters, who are sure to emphasize the presence o f contrary research, may 
be to present both arguments (disconfirming and confirming) together so that the 
evidence does not seem biased. A better strategy for Discrediters, on the other hand, 
could perhaps entail using more comprehensive, robust evidence to bolster the 
disconfirming information from attacks on its integrity. Thus, the preceding research on 
consumers’ beliefs about organic foods and subsequent reactions to disconfirmations 
could provide important inferences to help in the formulation o f communication, 
environmental, and policy strategies to educate (and update) consumers whenever new, 
accurate information emerges.
Limitations and Future Research
The research presented in this dissertation has several limitations. First, the study 
relies on data obtained from a sample o f undergraduate and graduate college students and 
university alumni. While such a group may not represent a standard sample o f 
consumers, college students (current and former) are consumers that may have strong 
subjective beliefs about certain products. Moreover, using student samples is not 
uncommon for empirically testing a theory. Supporters o f  using student subjects (e.g., 
Gordon, Slade and Schmitt 1986; Greenberg 1987; Lee and Baskerville 2003) argue that 
research should focus less on generalizability and thus student samples can be appropriate
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for building a theory and emphasizing its internal mechanism. Consequently, there is a 
reasonable justification for using student subjects when testing theory such as the 
dissonance theory.
Nevertheless, future research on this topic would greatly benefit from different 
samples o f  more typical consumers who have high involvement with organic food. For 
example, Lea and W orsley (2005) find that women are more positive about organic food 
than men. Specifically, their findings suggest that women are more likely to believe that 
organic food has more vitamins and minerals than conventional food. The results in this 
dissertation corroborate this notion since female subjects reported slightly higher means 
compared to male subjects for each o f  the three perceived benefits o f organic food.
Second, although experimentation is employed in the study, the resulting data 
from the survey responses are essentially cross-sectional in nature. An experimental 
design involving longitudinal data is more suitable to investigate the theorized causal 
relationships via structural equation modeling. Avenues for future research could include 
the examination o f long term effects o f belief disconfirmation on subsequent consumer 
behavior. This dissertation suggests that belief disconfirmations can induce dissonance 
which in turn can negatively impact marketing-related outcomes. Managers may derive 
greater practical implications from a long-term assessment o f these effects.
Third, the perceived value construct is measured using only one o f Sweeney and 
Soutar’s (2001) four proposed dimensions, i.e. quality value. Emotional, price, and social 
value are all left out o f  the measurement theory based on the view that such dimensions 
do not fit with the context o f the study. Holbrook and Hirschman (1982) suggest that 
focusing single mindedly on the consumer as information processor could limit our
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perception o f consumer behavior due to neglecting the experiential aspect. Therefore, a 
fruitful avenue o f future research may involve a hedonic assessment o f value. For 
example, Babin, Darden and Griffin (1994) propose a two-dimensional measure 
comprising utilitarian and hedonic shopping value. This conceptualization could provide 
a better measure o f  value since emotional aspects tend to spill over into information 
processing and decision-making (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). Thus, people buy 
products not only for what they can do but also for what they mean.
Fourth, the manipulation o f  evidence types into confirming and disconfirming 
conditions did not work as efficiently as anticipated. Over 20% o f subjects in 
disconfirming conditions are found to have preconceived negative views o f organic food 
and/or the organic industry. Hence, many subjects viewed the disconfirming evidence 
regarding organic food as “confirming” their existing beliefs. Future research could 
employ a quasi-experimental design to mitigate this quandary. For instance, instead o f 
randomly assigning subjects to one o f the eight conditions, subjects can be assigned to 
disconfirming (or confirming) conditions based on how they respond to a certain criterion 
(e.g. subjective beliefs, attitudes, etc.). This may provide the researcher with superior 
control, albeit at the expense o f internal validity since quasi-experimental results are 
especially prone to confounding variables.
Finally, the revised theoretical model contains an added structural path from 
purchase intention to positive word-of-mouth, whereas prior research generally supports 
a reverse causal path from word-of-mouth to purchase intention. The justification for this 
removed constraint is based on the notion that consumers are unlikely to engage in 
positive word-of-mouth until and unless they are willing to purchase a product
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themselves. Hence, this study defines word-of-mouth as the consumer's expressed 
likelihood o f making positive comments about organic food, while other research 
examines word-of-mouth from the information received (or sought) by the consumer 
point o f  view. Future research could examine additional outcomes following belief 
disconfirmations such as information seeking behavior (confirming or disconfirming). 
Those who seek confirming information to corroborate their own views following a belief 
disconfirmation may be especially prone to yielding to confirmation bias.
One area o f interest that may particularly exacerbate the confirmation bias is 
consumer superstitions. Consumers having superstitious beliefs and making uncanny 
associations is not uncommon in the marketplace, and this phenomenon may lead to 
irrational behavior. For example, Block and Kramer (2009) examined superstitious 
beliefs in the context o f  product performance expectations and found that consumers who 
do not hold superstitious beliefs adhere to the rational choice paradigm more so than 
consumers who do have certain superstitions. That is, consumers’ superstitious beliefs 
can lead to making purchases that run counter to economic rationality. Interestingly 
enough, results from Mowen and Carlson (2003) suggest a negative association between 
superstitious beliefs and attitudes regarding genetically modified foods. Examining 
whether the same relationship exists between consumer superstitions and organic food 






1) Disconfirming x  High Credibility x  3:
Stanford University researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies and 
concluded that fruits and vegetables labeled organic were no more nutritious and 
no less likely to be contaminated by dangerous bacteria like E. coli than 
conventionally grown foods, which tend to be far less expensive. The researchers 
also found no obvious health advantages to organic meats. The Stanford 
University researchers affirmed that there is currently no direct evidence that 
consuming an organic diet leads to improved health or lower risk o f disease. 
Furthermore, organic farming methods are not as environmentally friendly as 
once thought since these methods have lower yields and, thus, produce much less 
food than conventional farming on the same land area.
2) Disconfirming x  High Credibility x  1 *:
Stanford University researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f  studies and 
concluded that organic farming methods are not as environmentally friendly as 
once thought since these methods have lower yields and, thus, produce much less 
food than conventional farming on the same land area.
3) Disconfirming x  Low Credibility x  3:
Delta Community College researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f  studies 
and concluded that fruits and vegetables labeled organic were no more nutritious 
and no less likely to be contaminated by dangerous bacteria like E. coli than 
conventionally grown foods, which tend to be far less expensive. The researchers 
also found no obvious health advantages to organic meats. The Delta Community 
College researchers affirmed that there is currently no direct evidence that
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consuming an organic diet leads to improved health or lower risk o f disease. 
Furthermore, organic farming methods are not as environmentally friendly as 
once thought since these methods have lower yields and, thus, produce much less 
food than conventional farming on the same land area.
4) D isconfirm ingx Low Credibility x  I*:
Delta Community College researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies 
and concluded that organic farming methods are not as environmentally friendly 
as once thought since these methods have lower yields and, thus, produce much 
less food than conventional farming on the same land area.
5) Confirming x  High Credibility x  3:
Stanford University researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f  studies and 
concluded that fruits and vegetables labeled organic were more nutritious and less 
likely to be contaminated by dangerous bacteria like E. coli than conventionally 
grown foods. The researchers also found various health advantages to organic 
meats. The Stanford University researchers affirmed that there is direct evidence 
that consuming an organic diet can lead to improved health and lower risk of 
disease. Furthermore, organic farming is significantly less disturbing for the 
environment compared to conventional farming.
6) Confirming x  High Credibility x 1 *:
Stanford University researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies and 
concluded that organic farming is significantly less disturbing for the environment 
compared to conventional farming.
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7) Confirming x  Low Credibility x  3:
Delta Community College researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies 
and concluded that fruits and vegetables labeled organic were more nutritious and 
less likely to be contaminated by dangerous bacteria like E. coli than 
conventionally grown foods. The researchers also found various health 
advantages to organic meats. The Delta Community College researchers affirmed 
that there is direct evidence that consuming an organic diet can lead to improved 
health and lower risk o f disease. Furthermore, organic farming is significantly less 
disturbing for the environment compared to conventional farming.
8) Confirming x  Low Credibility x  1 *:
Delta Community College researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies 
and concluded that organic farming is significantly less disturbing for the 
environment compared to conventional farming.
*Weak-condition evidence is composed assuming that environmental friendliness is the 
least important o f  the three reasons for buying organic. This assumption is evaluated and 






Strongly Disagree Slightly Neutral Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I. Perceived Health Benefits: a consumer's subjective beliefs regarding the perceived 
healthiness o f  organic food.
I. The consumption o f organic food enhances my health.
2 . 1 believe that organic food enables me to live healthy.
3 . 1 am o f the view that the consumption o f organic food has a health-promoting effect.
4. Organic food and a health-conscious lifestyle match well.
II. Perceived Environmental Benefits: a consumer's subjective beliefs regarding the 
positive effects that organic products can have on the environment.
1. The production o f organic food goes easy on resources.
2 . 1 am o f the opinion that during the production o f organic food the environment 
is highly valued.
3. Organic foods are environmentally friendly products.
4. Organic food and environmentalism match well.
III. Perceived Safety Benefits: a consumer's subjective beliefs regarding the positive 
effects that organic food can have on safe consumption.
1 .1 feel that organic food is free o f chemical residues.
2 . 1 am o f the opinion that organic food is not contaminated.
3. Organic food ingredients are free o f  pesticides.
4 . 1 believe that organic food features high food safety.
Note: All three dimensions o f  perceived benefits o f organic food adapted from Bauer, 
Heinrich and Schafer (2013).
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Measuring Belief Disconfirmation
Congruency (Beliefs/Information): measures the similarity (or lack thereof) between a 
consum er’s prior beliefs about organic food and the new evidence that he or she has been 
exposed to (Giirhan-Canli and Maheswaran 1998).
1. How different was the information from what you expected? not at all /  very different
2. Indicate the extent to which the information was: totally expected/  unexpected
3. Indicate the extent to which the information was: not at all surprising /  very surprising
Measuring Consumer Dissonance
Not at - - Neutral - - Very
All Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Discomfort: measures the extent to which a person is experiencing a state o f






Strongly Disagree Slightly Neutral Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Involvement: measures a consumer’s level o f interest in organic food (adapted from 
Beatty and Talpade 1994).
1. In general I have a strong interest in organic food.
2. Organic food is very important to me.
3. Organic food matters a lot to me.
4 . 1 get bored when other people talk to me about organic food, (r)
5. Organic food is very relevant to me.
Assessing the Manipulation
Evidence Believability: measures the degree o f  agreement with the following evaluative 







Measuring the Outcome Variables
Strongly Disagree Slightly Neutral Slightly Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I. Consumer Perceived Value (Sweeney and Soutar 2001; Walsh, Shiu and Hassan 2014) 
Factor 1: Quality Value
1. Has consistent quality
2. Is well made
3. Has an acceptable standard o f quality
Factor 2: Emotional Value
4 . 1 enjoy it
5. Makes me want to consume it
6. Makes me feel good
Factor 3: Price Value
7. Is reasonably priced
8. Offers value for money
9. Is good for the price
Factor 4: Social Value
10. Help me feel accepted
11. Improves the way I am perceived
12. Makes a good impression on other people
II. Purchase Intention: measures the inclination o f a consumer to buy (or at least try) 
organic food in the future (adapted from Putrevu and Lord 1994).
1. It is very likely that I will buy organic food.
2 . 1 will purchase organic food the next time I need groceries.
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3 . 1 will definitely try to buy organic food.
4. Suppose that a friend called you to get your advice in his/her grocery shopping trip. 
Would you recommend him/her to buy organic?
III. Positive Word o f  Mouth: a consumer's expressed likelihood o f making positive 
comments about organic food is measured in this scale (adapted from Briiggen, Foubert, 
and Gremler 2011).
1 .1 am likely to say positive things about organic food to other people.
2 . 1 am likely to recommend organic food to a friend or colleague.
3 . 1 am likely to say positive things about organic food in general to other people.
4 . 1 am likely to encourage friends and relatives to buy organic food.
IV. Willingness to Pay a Price Premium: the amount a customer is willing to pay for 
organic food over conventional food o f the same package size or quantity (adapted from 
Netemeyer et al. 2004).
1. The price o f  organic food would have to go up quite a bit before I would switch to non- 
organic.
2 . 1 am willing to pay a higher price for organic food than for non-organic food.
3 . 1 am willing to p a y  % more for organic food over non-organic food:
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% or
more
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. I am willing to pay a lot more for organic food than non-organic food.
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Subjective Beliefs (M easurement #2)
Compared to your beliefs before you were exposed to the factual information, use the 
sliding scales below to indicate how your beliefs about organic food have changed:
1 .1 now believe that organic food is:
Less Healthy /  Unchanged /  More Healthy
2 . 1 now believe that organic food is:
Less Safe to Consume /  Unchanged /  More Safe to Consume
3. I now believe that organic food production is:
Less Environment-Friendly /  Unchanged /  More Environment-Friendly
Social Desirability Bias
Not - - Neutral - - Very
True True
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Short Balanced Inventory o f Desirable Responding Scale (Short BIDR-6) 
(Bobbio and Manganelli 2011; Paulhus 1984)
I. My first impressions o f people usually turn out to be right.
2 . 1 always know why I like things.
3. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
4 . 1 am fully in control o f my own fate.
5 . 1 never regret my decisions.
6 . 1 am a completely rational person.
7 . 1 am very confident in my judgments.
8. It’s all right with me if  some people happen to dislike me.
9 . 1 sometimes tell lies, if  I have to.
10. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage o f  someone.
I I . 1 always obey laws, even if  I’m unlikely to get caught.
1 2 .1 have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.
13.1 have never dropped litter on the street.
1 4 .1 have done things that I don’t tell other people about.
15.1 have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I w asn’t really sick.




1) What was your reaction to the researchers’ report on organic food? Please 
describe your reaction in as much detail as you can.
Beliefperseverance:
2) Why were you not convinced by the evidence presented to you? What additional 
evidence or information would help you change your stance? Please explain in as 
much detail as you can.
B elief change:
2) Why were you convinced by the evidence presented to you? What was the most 
significant factor in changing your perspective? Please explain in as much detail 
as you can.
All subjects'.
3) What do you think is the purpose o f  this study?
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